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PUNISHING WITHOUT FREE WILL 
 
Luis E. Chiesa* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Candide: Do you believe that mankind have always been cutting one 
another’s throats; that they were always liars, knaves, treacherous and 
ungrateful; always thieves, sharpers, highwaymen, lazy, envious and 
gluttons; always drunkards, misers, ambitious and blood-thirsty; always 
backbiters, debauchees, fanatics, hypocrites and fools? 
 
Martin: Do you not believe that hawks have always preyed upon pigeons, 
when they could light upon them? 
 
Candide: Certainly. 
 
Martin: Well, then, if the hawks have always had the same nature, what 
reason can you give why mankind should have changed theirs? 
 
Candide: Oh! There is a great deal of difference; because free will 
. . . .”1 
– Voltaire, Candide 
 
In a few memorable lines of dialogue between Candide and his faithful 
servant Martin, Voltaire eloquently conveyed the relevance of free will to our 
practices of punishing and blaming. In a naturalistic world, as Martin observes, 
human beings are merely another cog in the wheel of nature. As such, it would be 
as absurd to blame humans for their sins as it would be to blame hawks for eating 
pigeons. The always-optimistic Candide begs to differ. The hawk’s nature is fixed 
because animal conduct is determined by natural laws. Mankind’s nature, on the 
other hand, is variable because humans have the ability to change their ways. They 
have, in other words, free will. And it is because of this uniquely human capacity 
to freely choose to do otherwise that humans can and should be blamed for their 
crimes. 
Modern criminal law seems to reflect Candide’s view of human nature. Free 
will is central to retributive theories of punishment.2 For retributivists, the 
                                                 
* © 2011 Luis E. Chiesa. Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. 
1 VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE ch. XXI (1759), available at http://www.ourcivilisation.com/ 
smartboard/shop/voltaire/candide/chap21.htm. 
2 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 9 (2006) (observing that “[t]he so-called 
free will postulate is an essential premise of the [retributive] model”). 
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imposition of punishment is justified solely by reference to the offender’s deserts.3 
Under the standard view, the offender deserves punishment only if he could have 
abstained from committing the crime. On the other hand, the offender does not 
deserve to be punished if he could not have acted otherwise. William Blackstone 
asserted this view in his famous Commentaries, “punishments are . . . only 
inflicted for the abuse of that free will which God has given to man.”4 In contrast, 
it is “highly just and equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which 
are done through unavoidable force and compulsion.”5 This conception of the 
criminal law continues to influence courts and commentators to this day. As an 
appellate court explained several decades ago, “our whole criminal code 
presupposes that an individual possesses a free will and is accountable for his 
rational conduct.”6 
But what if Martin’s view of human nature is more accurate than Candide’s? 
What if mankind is no more to blame for their crimes than birds are to blame for 
eating their prey? As counterintuitive as Martin’s deterministic account of human 
nature might initially sound, many contemporary scientists and philosophers 
believe it to be closer to the truth than an account of human nature that 
presupposes the existence of free will.7 Recent neuroscientific experiments8 
coupled with advances in genetics and related fields9 increasingly suggest that 
humans have little control over a wide array of acts that most people believe are 
freely willed. This has led some respected scholars to contend, as psychologist 
Daniel Wegner famously noted, that free will is nothing more than an “illusion.”10 
Some find these views troubling, as they would call into question our practices of 
blaming and praising.11 After all, if every human act is determined by forces that 
human beings cannot control, how can they be blamed or praised for doing what 
                                                 
3 See generally LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 190 (2006) (discussing 
the justification of punishment). 
4 IV WILLIAM BLACKSONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1445 
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1902). 
5 Id. 
6 State v. Jones, 577 P.2d 357, 361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). See also, more recently, the 
judgment of the House of Lords in R v. Kennedy, [2007] UKHL 38, [14], stating that “[t]he 
criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will” and that “generally speaking, 
informed adults of sound mind are treated as autonomous beings able to make their own 
decisions how they will act.” 
7 See, e.g., Galen Strawson, The Bounds of Freedom, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FREE WILL 441 (Robert Kane ed., 2002). 
8 Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of 
Cerebral Activity (Readiness Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary 
Act, 106 BRAIN, no. 3, 1983 at 623–42. 
9 Regarding the way in which genetics and the environment affect our behavior, see 
Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 41 GEN. PSYCHOLOGIST, no. 1, 2006 at 3–4. 
10 DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 1 (2002). 
11 Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1144–45 
(1985). 
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they do?12 This would appear to cast a mortal blow to our criminal law, for most of 
the foundational doctrines that undergird our system of criminal justice seem to 
lose their coherence when unmoored from free will.13 
Nevertheless, we are faced with mounting scientific evidence against the 
existence of a uniquely human ability to escape the causal laws of the universe by 
way of uncaused conscious processes that mysteriously14 cause human action. 
Thus, many philosophers now argue that free will is compatible with 
determinism.15 They suggest that humans can be free even if it turns out that all 
events that take place in the universe, including human action, are determined by 
the interplay between what happened in the past and the present operation of 
natural laws.16 According to this account, Martin and Candide’s views of human 
nature are not incompatible. Humans who engage in criminal behavior may 
possess the sort of free will that makes them responsible for their actions even if 
their crimes, like the hawk’s eating of the pigeon, can be fully explained by the 
causal laws of nature. But why have philosophers gone out of their way to attempt 
to reconcile free will with causal determinism? The answer is simple. The truth of 
determinism seems to threaten the free will edifice upon which our formal and 
informal institutions of blaming and punishing are built. By demonstrating that 
free will is compatible with a universe wholly determined by natural laws, the 
philosopher can rescue the criminal law from the threat of determinism without 
needing to adopt the unpalatable position of denying determinism’s scientific 
plausibility. 
Those who attempt to reconcile free will with determinism appear to believe 
that many of the things intrinsically important to us, including our practices of 
blaming, praising, and punishing, would become meaningless in a world without 
free will.17 For example, P. F. Strawson believes that certain attitudes central to the 
human experience such as resentment, gratitude, anger, and love cannot be 
experienced unless we assume that human beings possess free will.18 If we are to 
continue exhibiting the sort of attitudes that make our lives meaningful, we must 
presuppose that others are responsible for their actions even if scientists 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1139, 1144–45. 
14 It is “mysterious” to contend that uncaused conscious processes cause human action 
because there is presently no scientific account that can explain how this can actually be 
the case. So far, experimental evidence suggests that human conduct, including conscious 
processes, is determined by causal events that lie beyond our control. 
15 These philosophers are dubbed “compatibilists.” See, e.g., Christopher Taylor & 
Daniel Dennett, Who’s Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 257. 
16 This is the textbook definition of determinism. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 7, at 
442–60. 
17 Moore, supra note 11, at 1144–45. 
18 Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 1, 1–25 (1962), 
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45, 45–67 (John Martin Fischer & 
Mark Ravizza eds., 1993). 
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demonstrate that human action is determined by causal forces beyond human 
control.19 Similarly, Michael Moore has argued that free will is essential to us 
because “[o]ur moral life is built upon our praising or blaming people when they 
help a friend, tell a bad joke, create a work of art, or write a clear and truthful 
essay.”20 As a result, rejecting free will is undesirable because it would lead to 
“falsify[ing] much of our moral life.”21 
This Article will argue that there are good moral reasons to conclude that the 
scientific plausibility of determinism ought to lead us to abandon the notion of free 
will. Contra P. F. Strawson and Moore, this Article suggests that rejecting free will 
does not undermine the human experience, and doing so is plausible and attractive 
because it would likely lead to more humane and efficient institutions of blaming 
and punishing. The argument consists of six parts. 
Part II fleshes out in more detail the claim that our criminal laws presuppose 
the existence of freely willed actors who are capable of meaningfully controlling 
their conduct. This simple postulate seems to lie at the heart of many foundational 
doctrines of criminal law, including the voluntary act requirement,22 the insanity 
defense,23 and the general theory of excuse defenses.24 It also undergirds certain 
important features of the proximate cause25 and mens rea26 doctrines. It is therefore 
difficult to deny that free will is embedded in the very fabric of our system of 
criminal justice. 
Part III examines the current state of the philosophical debates on free will. 
After discussing the literature, this Article concludes that the plausibility of the 
thesis of causal determinism is undeniable. At the very least, it is unclear whether 
humans actually have the ability to consciously control their conduct.27 The 
plausibility of determinism has triggered diverse reactions from the philosophical 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Moore, supra note 11, at 1144. 
21 Id. at 1045. 
22 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 273–81 (2007). 
23 Under the Model Penal Code formulation of the insanity defense, an actor is not 
criminally liable if he lacks the capacity to conform his conduct to the mandates of the law. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01. 
24 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking the Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a 
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982). 
25 According to general principles of proximate causation, “[t]he free, deliberate, and 
informed intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation created by 
the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first actor of 
criminal responsibility.” H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 326 
(1985) (emphasis added); see also Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus?, 48 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 391, 392 (1989). 
26 According to section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code, for example, a person acts 
“purposely” if his “conscious objective” is to commit the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02 (2001). 
27 Manuel Vargas, Response to Kane, Fischer and Pereboom, in FOUR VIEWS ON 
FREE WILL 204, 206 (Ernest Sosa ed., 2007). 
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community. Libertarians believe that determinism is incompatible with free will 
and that the recent literature, therefore, threatens to undermine free will.28 They 
argue, however, that humans are free because their decisions are ultimately 
grounded in irreducibly indeterministic processes, which are likely explained by 
the principles undergirding the field of quantum mechanics.29 Hard 
incompatibilists, on the other hand, believe that determinism is probably true and 
that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with free will.30 Finally, 
compatibilists believe that humans possess free will regardless of the truth of 
causal determinism.31 The primary goal of this part is to explore in detail the 
positions espoused by libertarians, hard incompatibilists, and compatibilists. 
Part IV looks at what legal scholars have to say about the free will debate and 
its relevance to criminal theory. Despite the obvious threat that recent scientific 
literature on the nature of consciousness poses for the conventional “free will 
centered” account of criminal law, legal theorists have paid surprisingly little 
attention to the subject. Most seem content to casually point out that it is unclear 
whether human beings have the kind of free will that our criminal laws assume we 
have. They then proceed to nonchalantly dismiss the problem as one that ought to 
be of concern for philosophers rather than lawyers. This is the tack taken by 
Douglas Husak in his book chapter on the criminal law’s voluntary act 
requirement.32 Others, like George Fletcher, have attempted to defend a libertarian 
account of free will by arguing that Noam Chomsky’s theory of language lends 
credence to the proposition that human action is inherently indeterminate.33 In 
contrast, some, like Stephen Morse,34 Kim Ferzan,35 and Michael Moore,36 adopt 
the classic compatibilist stance and argue that the sort of free will that is needed to 
make sense of the criminal law is not at odds with determinism. Finally, there are 
those who, like Larry Alexander,37 grant that determinism is incompatible with the 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Robert Kane, Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 406. 
29 Taylor & Dennett, supra note 15, at 259. 
30 See, e.g., Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard 
Incompatibilism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 477. 
31 Ishtiyaque Haji, Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 202. 
32 DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 78–122 (1987). After 
concluding that the law ought to abandon the voluntary act doctrine in favor of what he 
dubs the “control requirement,” Husak concedes that a strand of the philosophical literature 
on free will casts doubt on whether humans have the ability to exert meaningful control 
over their actions. Id. at 98. Surprisingly, however, he goes on to claim that this is a subject 
that he need not delve into. Id. 
33 FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 273–81 (2007). 
34 See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2545 (2007). 
35 LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 15 (2009). 
36 Moore, supra note 11. 
37 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 35, at 15 n.22. 
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structure of criminal law, but mysteriously declare themselves agnostics with 
regard to the truth of determinism. 
Given the intractable nature of the free will problem, Part V argues that the 
scientific, philosophical, and legal debate on the subject has led to a dialectical 
stalemate. A dialectical stalemate arises when proponents of an argument cannot 
muster sufficient evidence to decisively prove the argument, while the argument’s 
detractors cannot gather sufficient evidence to decisively refute it.38 Those who 
claim that humans have enough control over their actions to be considered morally 
responsible for their conduct have failed to conclusively demonstrate either that 
determinism is probably false39 or that the truth of determinism does not 
undermine their claim.40 In contrast, those who suggest that determinism is 
probably true and that it is incompatible with the free will necessary for moral 
responsibility have failed to decisively demonstrate the latter.41  
How are we to proceed in light of this dialectical stalemate? Some criminal 
theorists have thrown their hands up in despair and opted to favor the status quo 
over radically revising the criminal laws to make them compatible with the 
increasingly likely possibility that determinism is true.42 In contrast, Part V argues 
that the best way to move beyond the stalemate is to put forth normative arguments 
to demonstrate which of the competing solutions to the free will problem makes 
our life in general—and our practices of blaming and punishing in particular—
more appealing. After all, if the way out of the free will labyrinth is unclear, why 
not embark on the most attractive path until we finally stumble upon evidence that 
decisively demonstrates that we are headed in the wrong direction? 
Part VI contends that a life without free will is not as bad as most 
philosophers and legal scholars would have us believe. Taking a cue from Derk 
Pereboom’s writings on the subject,43 this Article suggests that it is not altogether 
clear that rejecting the notion of free will inevitably leads to renouncing certain 
attitudes that are inextricably part of the human experience. For example, consider 
love. Some philosophers have argued that love loses most of its meaning if we 
assume that others are not free to choose whether to love us and we are not free to 
determine whether to love them in return.44 This is far from obvious, as the case of 
small children illustrates. We truly and meaningfully love our newborn children 
even if we believe, as we should, that they are not (yet) capable of freely choosing 
to love us back. It would also seem that we will not stop loving our spouses, 
friends, and extended family merely because it is demonstrated to us that we did 
                                                 
38 JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, OUR STORIES: ESSAYS ON LIFE, DEATH, AND FREE WILL 
116–17 (2009). 
39 This is what libertarians like Kane must prove. 
40 This is what compatibilists like Dennett must demonstrate. 
41 This is what hard incompatibilists like Pereboom must prove. In light of recent 
scientific evidence, it would seem that hard determinists stand on solid footing regarding 
their claim that determinism is probably true. 
42 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 35, at 15 n.22. 
43 See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). 
44 Strawson, supra note 18, at 53. 
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not freely choose to feel what we feel for them. The same is true with most of the 
feelings that make our life worth living. 
Part VI also argues that, far from depriving life of meaning, the assumption 
that humans lack free will may actually make life more appealing. First, the 
practice of blaming other people for their sins and crimes loses meaning in a world 
without free will. Contrary to what some have argued, living without blaming 
others for their wrongs would not be fatal to interpersonal relationships. If it is 
true, as it seems to be, that human action is determined by factors they cannot 
control, it would intuitively follow that humans should not be blamed for the 
consequences of their conduct. Furthermore, even if we assume that it is fair to 
blame humans for engaging in conduct that they cannot control, it is unclear 
whether doing so is beneficial for mankind. After all, our practices of blaming 
have historically been linked to unappealing attitudes of resentment, anger, and 
vengeance. A world that does not encourage the formation of those attitudes 
would, at the very least, be less violent and cruel towards those who engage in 
wrongdoing. In light of the increasingly inhumane treatment that criminals receive 
both in this country and abroad,45 this would appear to be a welcome development. 
In Part VII, this Article argues that rather than leading to the disappearance of 
criminal law, assuming that humans lack free will might lead to a more appealing 
system of criminal justice.46 Once we presuppose that humans do not have enough 
control over their acts to be considered responsible for their conduct, it is clear that 
imposing punishment on wrongdoers for the purposes of exacting retribution is 
unwarranted. As a result, in a world without free will the purpose of punishment 
must shift from giving to the offender what he deserves, to protecting society from 
dangerous individuals who are nevertheless not to blame for their transgressions. 
This Article therefore contends that punishment should be reconceptualized as 
a type of quarantine in which individuals who are not responsible for the 
conditions that make them dangerous are deprived of certain liberties for the 
protection of others.47 Furthermore, just as the government has the responsibility to 
treat a person quarantined with swine flu in a manner that ensures her speedy 
recovery and encourages her return to life in society, the state should also have the 
                                                 
45 Our current system of criminal justice increasingly relies on incarceration as the 
preferred method of punishment for many of the most pervasive offenses committed by 
individuals today, such as weapon and drug possession offenses. This has generated a 
severe overcrowding problem in America’s prisons. This, in turn, leads to the inhumane 
treatment of inmates in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, the failure to 
provide them with adequate medical care, the creation of unsafe and unsanitary living 
conditions, and the creation of an environment which promotes violence and unrest 
amongst the prison population. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–24 (2011). The 
magnitude of the problem is such that the United States Supreme Court recently declared 
that the overcrowding problem in the California prison system has transformed the 
punishment imposed on these inmates into one that is “cruel and unusual” in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
46 See infra notes 335–374 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 347–350 and accompanying text. 
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duty to treat someone quarantined for committing an offense in a way that 
increases the likelihood that he will be able to return to societal life.48 
A system of criminal justice that does not assume that humans possess free 
will would also rely less on incarceration. We send people to jail mostly because 
we believe that they deserve to suffer for what they have done. It would be cruel, 
however, to intentionally make people suffer by throwing them in jail for doing 
something that they could not have abstained from doing. Consequently, if we 
assume that actors lack free will, it should lead us to seek alternatives to 
incarceration as a response to crime. This would spur a more efficient criminal 
law, as the resources that are consumed by our costly prison system could be 
diverted to more socially useful and humane methods of social control. 
Finally, the Article concludes by urging criminal lawyers and theorists to take 
seriously the idea that we might not have the sort of free will that informs most of 
our foundational criminal law doctrines. They should do this for two reasons. First, 
the scientific evidence increasingly suggests that humans lack the capacity to 
control their acts. Second, a criminal justice system that presupposes that human 
beings lack free will is more humane and efficient than one that assumes humans 
are free to act as they please. As a result, there are good reasons to believe that the 
most attractive way out of the free will maze is to assume that determinism and 
indeterminism are incompatible with the type of freedom that lies at the core of 
contemporary criminal law and theory. 
 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE WILL TO OUR CURRENT PRACTICES OF BLAMING 
AND PUNISHING 
 
Philosophers and scientists have long debated whether humans possess the 
sort of free will that undergirds Candide’s account of human nature.49 Although the 
debate rages in academic circles, most people assume that we do have the ability to 
freely choose our actions, and that, as a result of this capacity, it makes sense to 
blame or praise us for engaging in certain acts. This assumption is not only 
prevalent, but also deeply held—belief in free will is central to many of the 
practices that define our society. Free will is an essential tenet of Judeo-Christian 
morality.50 It is also central to our everyday practice of holding our friends and 
                                                 
48 See infra notes 356–361 and accompanying text. 
49 The modern formulation of the free will problem is sometimes traced back to the 
writings of Epicurus. See, e.g., Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 455 (2d ed. 1992) (“[N]ecessity is not answerable [to anyone], chance 
is unstable; while what occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and that it is to this that 
praise and blame are attached.”). Medieval scholars also addressed the free will problem. 
See, e.g., 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, question 83, art. 1 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920). Modern discussions of the problem 
are legion. For a compilation containing representative modern discussions of the free will 
problem, see DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL (Hackett Pub., 2d ed., 2009). 
50 According to Judeo-Christian thought, God created a world full of alternative 
courses of action, some of which are good and some of which are bad. Furthermore, he 
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loved ones accountable for what they do. When we chide our best friend for not 
keeping a secret, we typically do so as a way of expressing our firmly held 
conviction that she should have (and could have) abstained from acting the way 
she did. Given that belief in free will pervades so many aspects of our lives, it 
should come as no surprise that it is also essential to understanding our current 
approach to criminal law. In the following pages, this Article discusses some ways 
in which belief in free will shapes our practices of blaming and punishing. 
 
A.  The Voluntary Act Requirement 
 
As any first-year law student knows, there can be no criminal liability without 
proof that the defendant engaged in the actus reus of the offense charged.51 Actus 
reus is the Latin term for the “guilty act” which must take place if an individual is 
to be subjected to criminal punishment.52 It is a basic principle of criminal law that 
an act is “guilty,” and therefore punishable, only if it is voluntary.53 This has come 
to be known among courts and commentators as the criminal law’s so-called 
“voluntary act principle or requirement.”54 Pursuant to this principle, there can be 
no criminal liability for involuntary acts that are “not a product of the effort or the 
determination of the actor.”55 As a result, harm brought about by a bodily 
movement that is the product of a reflex, convulsion, or sleepwalking does not 
trigger the imposition of criminal liability.56 Furthermore, an individual may only 
be held liable for what he does rather than for who he is. As a result, the criminal 
law may legitimately prohibit the act of acquiring cocaine, but not the status of 
being a drug addict.57 
The nexus between the voluntary act requirement and free will is evident. An 
act may lack free will if it is the product of the actor’s volition but internal or 
                                                 
endowed humans with the capacity to freely choose amongst these alternative courses of 
action. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 30:19 (“I [God] have set before you life and death, blessing 
and cursing: therefore choose life . . .”). 
51 See HUSAK, supra note 33, at 78. 
52 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (9th ed. 2009). 
53 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (2001). 
54 See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 97 (1968) (tracing 
the legal understanding of voluntary action to John Austin, who theorized that a human 
action is a “muscular contraction” caused by a “volition” or an “act of will”). 
55 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d). 
56 According to the MODEL PENAL CODE section 2.01(2), reflexes, convulsions and 
bodily movements during unconsciousness or sleep “are not voluntary acts within the 
meaning of this Section.” See also State v. Sowry, 803 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004) (“[A]cts performed while unconscious or sleepwalking are not voluntary acts [that 
generate criminal liability].”); State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me. 1996) (“To be 
voluntary an act must be the result of an exercise of defendant’s conscious choice to 
perform [it], and not the result of reflex [or] convulsion . . . .”). 
57 The prohibition of status crimes is so fundamental that the Supreme Court has held 
that the Eighth Amendment proscribes punishing mere status. Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). 
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external pressures undermine the actor’s volition significantly.58 On the other hand, 
an act may also lack free will when it is not the product of the actor’s volition.59 
Conduct that fails to satisfy the criminal law’s voluntary act requirement is an 
example of the latter type of conduct. Involuntary acts are thus not reflective of 
free will. This is one of the reasons why the voluntary act requirement is such an 
essential feature of our criminal law. As the Seventh Circuit noted: 
 
In the narrowest sense, every crime must be the product of defendant’s 
free will; it must reflect his choice to perform the criminal act. If the act 
itself was the result of a mere reflex, or muscular spasm, or was caused 
by physical duress or compulsion, even the narrowest intent would be 
absent and the defendant would be innocent of crime; indeed, it could be 
said that he did not act at all. It is in this sense that the traditional defense 
of “compulsion” or “necessity” may justify an act that would be unlawful 
if it had reflected a deliberate exercise of the defendant’s free will.60 
 
The voluntary act principle reflects the deeply held belief that it is unfair to punish 
someone for engaging in acts that are not the product of a free will. 
 
B.  Legal Causation 
 
If a defendant is charged with a crime that brings about a harmful 
consequence, she can only be held liable if her conduct caused the harmful 
consequence to materialize. A defendant’s conduct is considered a cause of the 
harm only if it is both an “actual” and “legal” (or “proximate”) cause of the harm.61 
Conduct is an “actual” cause of harm if the harm would not have occurred but for 
the defendant’s act.62 The standard for determining whether the defendant’s 
conduct was a “legal” cause of the harm is not settled. Some courts have held that 
                                                 
58 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that there is a sense in which acts 
done under extreme pressure, such as throwing cargo overboard during a storm in order to 
save oneself, are not voluntary and thus not reflective of free will, for no one would choose 
any such act in itself. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 52–53 (Martin Ostwald trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962). 
59 According to Robert Nozick, for example, we lack free will if we are not the 
originators of our acts. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 291–92 (1981). 
Therefore, we lack free will when our acts are the product of something other than our 
volitions. 
60 United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1971). 
61 See, e.g., State v. Rivas, 896 P.2d 57, 62 (Wash. 1995) (“In crimes which are 
defined to require specific conduct resulting in a specified result, the defendant’s conduct 
must be the “legal” or “proximate” cause of the result. Before criminal liability is imposed, 
the conduct of the defendant must be both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the “legal” or 
“proximate” cause of the result.” (citation omitted)). 
62 E.g., People v. Zak, 457 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (citing a well-known 
criminal law treatise, the court stated that “[a] factor is an actual cause of a result if the 
result would not have occurred when it did in the absence of that factor”). 
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determinations of legal causation hinge on whether the harm was foreseeable in 
light of defendant’s conduct,63 while others have suggested that legal causation 
depends on whether the harmful result can be directly traced back to the 
defendant’s conduct.64 In contrast, the Model Penal Code suggests that the 
defendant’s conduct ought to be considered the legal cause of the harm unless the 
connection between the act and the harm that resulted is too tenuous to have a just 
bearing on the defendant’s liability.65 Regardless of which view of proximate cause 
is adopted, courts and commentators agree that an event that takes place after the 
defendant has acted but before the harm has materialized may sever the link 
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm.66 There is also agreement that such 
intervening events are more likely to break the causal connection between the 
defendant’s act and the harm if the events involve a voluntary act by the victim or 
a third party.67 
Examples abound that illustrate the relevance of the victim’s voluntary 
conduct to determinations of legal causation. Perhaps the most common example 
involves an actor who provides another person the means with which to commit 
suicide.68 Does this conduct constitute homicide? The general rule in these cases is 
that the defendant is not liable for homicide because the victim’s voluntary 
decision to commit suicide constitutes an intervening cause, which breaks the 
causal link between the defendant’s action (supplying the means to commit 
suicide) and the result that ensued (death of the victim).69 Given that the victim’s 
conduct is irrelevant to the criminal law,70 why do the victim’s voluntary acts 
determine the defendant’s liability in this context? It seems that the voluntary 
conduct of the victim is important in these cases because freely willed acts occupy 
a special place in our legal judgments about the causal connections between certain 
events. For better or worse, the law of causation reflects a deeply held belief that 
freely willed acts have more causal force than non-freely willed acts. As one 
Alabama court stated, “[a] determination as to whether the conduct of a person 
                                                 
63 E.g., Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Obviously, 
some element of foreseeability limits criminal causation just as it limits principles of civil 
‘proximate causation.’”). 
64 See, e.g., People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 773–74 (N.Y. 1974) (asserting that the 
defendants should not be found guilty unless their conduct “was a cause of death 
sufficiently direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal, and not the tort, law”). 
65 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (2001). 
66 The reference is, of course, to the doctrine of intervening causation. For a 
discussion of intervening causation in the criminal law, see Starkenburg v. State, 934 P.2d 
1018, 1022–26 (Mont. 1997) (discussing intervening acts by a third-party). 
67 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 162 (1997) (discussing cases in 
which a voluntary intervening act by the victim was found to break the causal connection). 
68 See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 735–39 (Mich. 1994). 
69 See id. at 445. 
70 See generally VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS: 
COMPARATIVE LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 9–35 (2009) (explaining that the victim’s 
conduct is irrelevant except for a few exceptions). 
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caused the suicide of another must necessarily include an examination of the 
victim’s free will,” since “[c]ases have consistently held that the ‘free will of the 
victim is seen as an intervening cause which . . . breaks the chain of causation’ 
between the defendant’s act and the victim’s death.”71 
 
C.  Mens Rea 
 
Edward Coke’s often-cited assertion that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea is as true today as it was when it was first asserted.72 The Latin maxim means 
that an “act does not make a person guilty unless their mind is also guilty.” This 
mens rea requirement has generally led to punishing the occurrence of harm only if 
the actor intended to bring about the harm.73 Although punishing negligent 
wrongdoing is not unheard of, most core criminal offenses can only be committed 
intentionally.74 Criminalization of negligently caused harm is mostly relegated to 
so-called public welfare offenses whose commission does not usually stigmatize 
the offender in the same way as the commission of a core crime such as rape or 
theft.75 In spite of the traditional reluctance to punish negligent harm, some core 
offenses can be committed negligently. The most salient example is the 
criminalization of negligent homicide, which is considered an offense in every 
American jurisdiction.76 However, even when a harm caused by a negligent act is 
criminalized, it is always punished less severely than an intentional act causing the 
same kind of harm.77 
It is difficult to explain criminal law’s unwillingness to punish negligent 
wrongdoing, especially since, as tort law illustrates, damage caused by the 
negligent wrongdoer is, all things being equal, identical to damage caused by an 
                                                 
71 Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (quoting S.W. Brenner, 
Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of 
“Causing Suicide,” 147 ALB. L. REV. 62, 83 (1982)). 
72 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING TREASON 
AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES, at c.1, fo.10 (1797). 
73 See, e.g., Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (“[A]n injury 
can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention.”). 
74 This is the case, for example, with the offenses of rape, robbery, burglary and 
kidnapping. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2001) (Rape); id. § 222.1 (Robbery); id. 
§ 221.1 (Burglary); id. § 212.1 (Kidnapping). When the definition of an offense does not 
include a mental state, the offense can only be committed purposely, knowingly, or 
recklessly, but not negligently. Id. § 2.02(3). 
75 The classic discussion of public welfare offenses is still Francis B. Sayre, Public 
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933). 
76 The Model Penal Code’s negligent homicide provision is illustrative of the typical 
negligent homicide statute. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4. 
77 Negligent homicide is always punished less severely than intentional homicide. In 
New York, for example, negligent homicide is a Class E felony, whereas intentional 
homicide is either a Class B or Class A felony. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 
(McKinney 2009) (criminally negligent homicide), with id. §§ 125.25–125.27 (versions of 
intentional homicide). 
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intentional wrongdoer.78 For example, an actor who kills a victim by deliberately 
poisoning her inflicts the same harm as the actor who kills a victim by carelessly 
running her over with his car, regardless of the actor’s mental state when 
committing the offense. Nevertheless, the careless killing will be punished much 
less severely than the intentional killing. The standard explanation for this 
differential treatment is that an actor who intentionally causes harm is more 
blameworthy than an actor who negligently causes the same harm.79 After all, as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out when discussing the different moral quality of 
intentional and negligent acts, “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled 
over and being kicked.”80  
The perceived differences in the blameworthiness of these acts are 
inextricably linked to beliefs about the degree of free will with which intentional 
and negligent wrongdoers act. Intentional harm causation is thus believed more 
deserving of condemnation than negligent harm causation because, as the Supreme 
Court stated in Morrissette v. United States, of the criminal law’s “universal and 
persistent . . . belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and 
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”81 As a result of 
this belief, some argue that “our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of 
punishing the vicious will,” for it assumes that the paradigmatic case of 
wrongdoing is that of a “free agent confronted with a choice between doing right 
and doing wrong and freely choosing . . . to do wrong.”82 
 
D.  Legal Insanity 
 
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten attempted to assassinate the British Prime 
Minister.83 Given that M’Naghten claimed that he committed the crime while in a 
state of mental incapacity, the House of Lords came up with a set of rules for 
determining when a defendant should be acquitted as a result of insanity. The rule 
set out by the House of Lords in the case, known as the M’Naghten test for legal 
insanity, holds that a defendant should be relieved of criminal liability only if at 
the time of the crime he suffered from a defect of reason or mental disease that 
                                                 
78 Punitive damages can be imposed on the intentional wrongdoer. This aspect of tort 
law, as the term “punitive” implies, more closely resembles criminal than civil law. See 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48 (1983) (recognizing that “punitive damages in tort cases 
may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, 
serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross negligence”). 
79 See generally JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 135–41 
(1960) (evaluating the various theories behind punishing negligent homicide). 
80 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881). 
81 Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
82 Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS B. SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON 
CRIMINAL LAW, at xxix, xxxvi–xxxvii (1927). 
83 Michael Stoll, Note, Miles to Go Before We Sleep: Arizona’s “Guilty Except 
Insane” Approach to the Insanity Defense and Its Unrealized Promise, 97 GEO. L.J. 1767, 
1772 (2009). 
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prevented him from appreciating the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his act.84 
Several decades after M’Naghten’s case was decided, courts started invoking a 
different standard of insanity that has been dubbed the “irresistible impulse” test.85 
According to the irresistible impulse test, a defendant should be acquitted if at the 
time of the commission of the offense he suffered from a mental disease or 
condition that prevented him from controlling his conduct.86  
Subsequently, the drafters of the Model Penal Code decided to combine the 
M’Naghten and “irresistible impulse” tests.87 Under the Model Penal Code, a 
defendant will be acquitted for reason of insanity if at the time of the crime he 
suffered from a mental condition or defect that caused him to lack substantial 
capacity88 either to appreciate the wrongfulness89 of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the mandates of the law. Although the M’Naghten test continues to be 
applied in many American jurisdictions, a substantial number of states apply the 
Model Penal Code’s combined M’Naghten-Irresistible Impulse test.90 
The M’Naghten test of legal insanity illustrates the role of free will in criminal 
law. The test focuses on whether the cognitive capabilities of the defendant were 
undermined by mental disease or defect in a way that prevented him from 
appreciating the import of his conduct and the consequences of his acts. These 
cognitive impairments preclude the imposition of liability because, as one judge 
put it, they weaken “the power in man to make a choice between alternative 
courses of action.”91 Thus, courts frequently construe the M’Naghten rules as a 
vehicle to determine whether the defendant exercised the sort of free will that 
undergirds our conventional practices of blaming and punishing. Consequently, 
                                                 
84 M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722–23 (1843). 
85 The irresistible impulse test can be traced back to Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 
1887). 
86 Id. The test has also come to be known as the “policeman at the elbow” test, for it is 
asserted that someone commits a crime pursuant to an irresistible impulse if he would have 
committed the offense even if a police officer was standing next to him. For a relatively 
recent discussion of the “policeman at the elbow” test, see People v. Jackson, 627 N.W.2d 
11, 13–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001). 
88 The Model Penal Code standard broadens the scope of the insanity defense, for it 
merely requires a showing of a lack of “substantial capacity” to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the conduct or to control the act rather than a showing of a complete 
absence of knowledge (M’Naghten) or a total lack of control over the conduct (irresistible 
impulse). See id. 
89 The drafters of the Model Penal Code pointed out that states drafting an insanity 
defense have to choose between requiring that the actor “lack capacity to appreciate” the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or demanding that the actor lack capacity to understand the 
criminality of his conduct. Id. The difference is significant. An actor does not appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct if he fails to see that his act is legally or morally wrongful. 
In contrast, an actor does not appreciate the criminality of his conduct if he fails to see that 
his conduct is against the law. 
90 See 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 104 (15th ed. 1994). 
91 State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505, 529 (Wis. 1962) (Hallows, J., dissenting). 
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many courts that adhere to the M’Naghten standard of insanity do so because 
“[t]he criminal law has long been based upon the concept of freedom of choice and 
adherence to the M'Naghten test . . . recognizes that those who are incapable of 
understanding the wrongfulness of their conduct have no opportunity of choice 
. . . .”92  
The “irresistible impulse” test focuses on impairment of defendant’s volitional 
capabilities rather than the undermining of his cognitive faculties like M’Naghten, 
but the rationale underlying the judicial recognition of the irresistible impulse rule 
is also tied to the concept of free will. Thus, it is widely believed that the 
irresistible impulse rule may be invoked only when a defendant demonstrates that 
the commission of the criminal act “[could not] be resisted or overcome because 
insanity or mental disease has destroyed the freedom of will, the power of self-
control, and the choice of [the defendant’s] actions.”93 Given that the Model Penal 
Code test combines the M’Naghten rule with the irresistible impulse standard for 
legal insanity, it is sensible to conclude that the Model Penal Code’s formulation 
of the defense is connected to free will in much the same manner as the other two 
tests. 
 
E.  Duress 
 
A defendant may successfully invoke the defense of duress when he is 
coerced to engage in wrongful conduct by the use of unlawful force upon the 
defendant or a third person.94 According to the Model Penal Code, the force with 
which the defendant is coerced must be of such a nature that a “person of 
reasonable firmness . . . would have been unable to resist [it].”95 A defendant who 
commits a crime under duress cannot be fairly blamed for engaging in the unlawful 
act.96 Therefore, the duress defense functions as an excuse that negates the actor’s 
culpability without excluding the wrongfulness of his act.97 The duress excuse is 
sometimes called the defense of “compulsion,”98 given that the defendant who acts 
under duress is “compelled” by threats to engage in an act that he otherwise would 
not perform. The coercive force that triggers the duress defense must imminently 
jeopardize the life or limb of the defendant or his family.99 Therefore, it is 
generally held that threats to property cannot ground a successful duress defense. 
The idea underlying this distinction is that society can legitimately expect citizens 
                                                 
92 People v. Horn, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
93 Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Va. 1960). 
94 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 229 P.3d 221, 226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
95 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (2001). 
96 See FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 148–49. 
97 Excuse defenses negate the actor’s blameworthiness without negating the 
wrongfulness of the act. In contrast, justification defenses negate the wrongfulness of the 
act. Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 746–48 (2008) (discussing the justification/excuse distinction). 
98 See, e.g., State v. Baker, 197 P.3d 421, 426–27 (Kan. 2008). 
99 Id. at 427. 
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to sacrifice their property interests in order to avoid wrongfully harming others, 
whereas it cannot legitimately require its citizens to sacrifice their lives, the lives 
of their loved ones, or physical integrity in order to prevent unlawful harm to 
others.100 
Amongst the many theories that have been advanced to explain the 
exculpatory force of duress, the two most commonly invoked are the 
“involuntariness” and the “hard choice” theories of duress. According to the 
involuntariness theory, “duress exculpates actors whose choice-making capabilities 
are substantially reduced by the coercive situation that generates the defense.”101 In 
these cases, the reduction in the actor’s freedom to choose is so significant that the 
coerced actor’s choice is in reality “no choice at all”—the duress exculpates the 
actor because her capacity to choose to do otherwise is “absent” in light of the 
coercion.102 According to the hard choice theory of duress, an actor is excused 
when the coercive situation puts him in the undesirable position of having to 
decide to preserve either his life or bodily integrity or the fundamental interests of 
others.103 Those who face this “do it or else” situation do not act culpably if they 
choose to harm others because society believes that a reasonable person facing the 
same hard choice would have acted in the same manner.  
Not surprisingly, what the involuntariness and hard choice theories of duress 
have in common is that the exculpatory force of the defense is in some way tied to 
the breadth and scope of the actor’s choices. The less choice we have and the 
harder the choice becomes, the less responsible we are for our “choice.” Thus, the 
conventional understanding of the duress defense presupposes the existence of an 
individual endowed with freedom of choice whose will is overborne by coercive 
threats.104 
 
                                                 
100 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, ¶ 12(c) (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (suggesting that duress creates “no moral 
alternative” for the person acting under it). 
101 Chiesa, supra note 97, at 758; see also People v. Graham, 129 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (establishing that the defendant has the “burden of showing duress” 
by a raising a reasonable doubt); State v. Rouleau, 528 A.2d 343, 350 (Conn. 1987) 
(“[D]uress may be seen as removing the very basis of criminal culpability.”). 
102 See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 251 (2002). 
103 For an examination and defense of the “hard-choice” theory of excuse and duress, 
see Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 114, 124–29 (William C. 
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the 
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1567, 1663–64 (1990). 
104 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wojciechowski, No. 92456, 2000 WL 537244, at *3 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000) (stating that the prosecution must “prove[] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the crime was the result of that person’s free will and not the result of 
duress or coercion such as would destroy that person’s free will”); see also Minton v. State, 
305 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that defendant’s conduct is only criminal 
if he decided to commit the crime “as a result of his own free will . . . not the result of 
duress or coercion which would overcome his free will”). 
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F.  Entrapment 
 
An actor may sometimes invoke police entrapment as a defense to criminal 
liability. There are two versions of the entrapment defense. According to the 
“objective” version of the defense, a defendant who the police instigated to commit 
a crime may successfully plead entrapment “if the law enforcement conduct is 
likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.”105 
Therefore, the objective approach to entrapment “focus[es] on the conduct of the 
police and [is] not concerned with the defendant’s prior criminal activity or other 
indicia of a predisposition to commit crime.”106 In contrast, the subjective version 
of entrapment focuses on the defendant’s readiness to commit the crime rather than 
on the outrageousness of the governmental conduct.107 More specifically, the 
subjective version of the defense can only be invoked if the police induced a 
person to commit an offense that he was not predisposed to commit prior to being 
approached by governmental authorities.108 Therefore, “[t]he subjective defense of 
entrapment succeeds only if the government, not the accused, is the source of the 
criminal design.”109 The defense, however, “fails if the accused is previously 
disposed to commit the crime, and the government merely facilitates or assists the 
criminal scheme.”110 Although the objective version of the defense has garnered 
considerable support amongst commentators, and was adopted by the drafters of 
the Model Penal Code, the subjective approach to entrapment continues to be 
applied in a majority of American jurisdictions.111 
With the understanding that the subjective version of entrapment allows the 
actor to invoke the defense only if he was not predisposed to commit the crime 
before being approached by the police, the defense fails if his decision to commit 
the criminal act was a product of his own volition. On the other hand, the 
defendant can successfully invoke entrapment if he proves that the police caused 
him to decide to commit the offense. Whether the entrapment defense bars 
criminal liability thus hinges on whether the defendant can be said to have freely 
willed the commission of the crime. More specifically, the entrapment defense will 
succeed if the defendant did not freely will the commission of the crime because 
the police caused him to engage in the wrongful act. However, the defendant’s 
entrapment claim will fail if he voluntarily decided to commit the crime.  
It has been held that “[o]nce the entrapment defense is raised, the State bears 
the burden of showing that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and 
that the level of police activity did not persuasively affect the free will of the 
                                                 
105 People v. Watson, 990 P.2d. 1031, 1032 (Cal. 2000). 
106 Commonwealth v. Weiskerger, 554 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1989). 
107 See, e.g., Hernández v. State, 17 So. 3d 748, 750–51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
108 See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–50 (1992). 
109 One Way Fare v. Dep’t of Consumer Prot., 901 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006). 
110 Id. 
111 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8(b) (2d ed. 2003). 
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accused.”112 Therefore, the determinative inquiry in entrapment cases is whether 
“the agents overpowered the free will of the defendant and caused him to commit” 
an offense that he was not predisposed to commit.113 Therefore, the availability of 
the subjective version of the entrapment defense, as with many other criminal 
defenses, depends on considerations of free will and voluntariness. 
 
III.  DO WE HAVE FREE WILL? SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Free will is as essential to explaining our current practices of blaming and 
punishing as it is to understanding Candide’s view of human nature.114 But do we 
really have the sort of free will that allows us to make sense of Candide’s 
conception of evil and in turn furnishes the foundations for our system of criminal 
justice? At first glance, this appears to be a silly question. After all, humans share a 
deeply held belief that what we do is usually a product of what we consciously 
want to do. However, as history demonstrates, widely shared beliefs often turn out 
to be false. For thousands of years, humans believed that the world was flat and 
that earth stood still while the sun and the planets revolved around it. Could it be 
that, despite appearances to the contrary, the widely shared belief that humans are 
endowed with free will is as false as these other once widely held beliefs are? As it 
turns out—and as the rest of this section explains—it is still very much an open 
question whether we do in fact have the kind of free will that undergirds our 
criminal laws. 
 
A.  Causal Determinism and the Free Will Problem 
 
One of the problems frequently presented in debates about free will is that the 
meaning of “free will” often remains undefined or is only vaguely or confusingly 
fleshed out. In order to avoid such confusion, fruitful discussions about the nature 
and importance of free will must begin by defining the term. The problem is that 
there are many plausible ways to define free will.115 So how can one defend 
choosing one definition of free will over another? A nonarbitrary and promising 
way to choose amongst competing definitions of free will is to select the definition 
that sheds more light on the question addressed by the author. It thus makes sense 
to define free will for the purposes of this Article in a way that illuminates the 
                                                 
112 Jordan v. State, 692 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
113 United States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
114 See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text. 
115 Thomas Hobbes, for example, defined free will as acting in an uncoerced fashion 
or, more specifically, acting in the absence of external impediments. THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 86 (1904). In contrast, Harry Frankfurt defines free will as an action performed 
under circumstances in which the actor identifies with the volition that motivated his act. 
Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE WILL 81–95 
(Gary Watson ed., 1982). Other philosophers define free will differently. See generally 
Taylor & Dennett, supra note 15, at 258 (stating multiple definitions of free will). 
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connection between free will and criminal liability. Free will is relevant to criminal 
liability because blame is typically a prerequisite for the imposition of punishment. 
It is generally believed that an actor can be blamed for committing an offense only 
if he freely willed to engage in conduct constitutive of the offense. As a result, it 
makes sense to define free will for the purposes of this Article as the degree of 
freedom that makes judgments of blame and attributions of moral responsibility 
possible. 
Once free will is defined in this manner, it is easy to see why many 
contemporary scientists and philosophers believe that free will is threatened by 
causal determinism.116 Causal determinism is the belief that everything that 
happens in the universe, including human conduct, is the product of everything that 
has happened in the past in combination with the operation of natural laws.117 
Contrary to what some have argued, causal determinism does not lead to the 
conclusion that human desires and intentions cannot impact future events because 
“what will be, will be” regardless of what actors wish or desire to do. Aristotle, for 
example, claimed that if causal determinism obtains there would be no need to 
deliberate or think about our future actions because whatever will happen will in 
fact happen regardless of what we think or do.118 Determinists do not necessarily 
share this thesis, because they believe that human conduct is causally determined 
by myriad factors, including intentions, motives, and desires. Whether a 
Mayweather-Pacquiao boxing match will take place in the future is causally 
conditioned by a series of factors, including, but not limited to, the desires of 
Mayweather and Pacquiao. Determinists, of course, also believe that such intents, 
motives, and desires are causally determined by other factors, such as the actor’s 
upbringing and her genetic makeup.119 This, however, does not commit the 
determinist to believing that human beliefs and desires cannot impact future states 
of affairs, for the determinist thesis affirms the causal role played by such 
subjective mental states. 
There are at least four reasons that suggest the thesis of causal determinism 
ought to be taken seriously. First, there is scientific support for the view that the 
behavior of macroscopic objects (including human beings) is causally determined 
by the confluence of the past and natural laws. The conventional view is that 
classical physics is mostly a deterministic affair. 120 There are, however, instances 
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in which the deterministic nature of classical physics breaks down.121 Contrarily, 
quantum mechanics is conventionally viewed as mostly governed by 
indeterminism. Nevertheless, there might be instances in which determinism seeps 
into quantum mechanics.122 In any case, there seems to be significant scientific 
support for the view that some have called “adequate determinism,” which holds 
that indeterministic quantum effects are mostly negligible at the macroscopic level. 
Second, neuroscientific studies, such as the ones famously carried out by Benjamin 
Libet, suggest that human conduct is determined by unconscious processes that are 
not within the control of the actor.123 Third, biological studies demonstrate that 
some aspects of human behavior are largely determined by our genetic makeup.124 
Finally, several psychological studies hint at the possibility that many aspects of 
human behavior are determined to a significant extent by environmental factors.125 
None of these reasons alone are enough to establish the truth of causal 
determinism. Nevertheless, the combination of all of these factors does, at the very 
least, cast serious doubt on whether human conduct can be traced back to 
indeterministic processes. In fact, the strongest evidence to date in favor of the 
conclusion that human conduct is not causally determined is the robust, but 
scientifically unsupported, intuition that we control our destinies in a way that 
belies the thesis of determinism. 
Most people believe that actors can be blamed or praised for what they do 
only if they have the ability to choose to act differently. Philosophers call this the 
principle of alternate possibilities.126 Causal determinism threatens the principle of 
alternate possibilities because it suggests that, given the fixity of the past and the 
immutability of natural laws, humans lack control over the factors that shape their 
conduct. As a result, some philosophers—called incompatiblists—have concluded 
that free will is incompatible with causal determinism.127 “Libertarian” 
incompatibilists believe that we possess free will because the thesis of causal 
determinism is likely false.128 In contrast, “hard incompatibilists” believe that if 
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causal determinism is true, we should abandon the idea of free will. They also 
argue that free will is incompatible with indeterminism.129 The so-called 
“compatibilists” believe that we have the sort of free will that underlies our 
judgments of blame and praise even if causal determinism obtains.130 The 
remainder of Part III explores in more detail the views held by libertarians, hard 
incompatibilists and compatibilists.  
 
B.  Libertarianism 
 
Libertarians argue that belief in free will is not compatible with a 
deterministic account of human behavior. According to libertarianism, true 
freedom of the will requires actual and accessible alternative possibilities.131 That 
is, conduct is free in the sense required for moral responsibility if, and only if, the 
actor could have chosen to do otherwise.132 An actor has access to alternative 
possibilities if there are different possible courses of conduct available to him and 
it is ultimately up to him to decide which one of the options to pursue. Libertarians 
concede that actors would not have access to these alternative possibilities if the 
thesis of causal determinism were true.133 Nevertheless, they argue that humans do 
have access to the alternative possibilities that free will requires because causal 
determinism is false.134 Thus, libertarians maintain that irreducibly indeterminate 
processes ultimately produce human conduct.135 As a result, the soundness of the 
libertarian thesis depends on whether a plausible scientific case can be made that 
undetermined forces cause human conduct, unlike the behavior of most other 
things in the universe. 
The distinguished libertarian philosopher Robert Kane has come up with an 
ingenious way of defending the thesis that human behavior can be traced back to 
indeterministic processes. Kane mounts his defense of indeterminism by 
borrowing heavily from the field of quantum mechanics.136 Quantum mechanics 
are the laws of physics that apply to the behavior of atomic and subatomic 
particles.137 What makes quantum mechanics interesting—and what made Einstein 
cringe whenever he talked about the implications of the theory—is that atomic and 
subatomic particles behave quite differently than larger particles.138 Whereas the 
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behavior of macroscopic particles appears to be fully determined by causal laws, 
quantum mechanics suggests that the behavior of microscopic particles is not 
causally determined in the same way.139 More specifically, quantum mechanics 
holds that we can attempt to predict the behavior of subatomic particles, but we 
can never be certain of how these particles are actually going to behave.140 Kane 
puts this insight to good use by positing that the neuron firings that ultimately 
determine our conduct are the product of processes that originate at the subatomic 
level and, therefore, are not fully determined by the past and the operation of 
natural laws.141 This allows Kane to suggest that, in light of quantum mechanics 
and the possibility that such processes undergird the workings of the human brain, 
causal determinism may very well prove to be false, at least insofar as it purports 
to explain human behavior.142 
 
C.  Hard Incompatibilism 
 
Hard incompatibilists, like libertarians, believe that free will is incompatible 
with causal determinism.143 However, unlike libertarians, hard incompatibilists 
argue that free will is also incompatible with indeterminism. Therefore, hard 
incompatibilists suggest that belief in free will should be abandoned regardless of 
whether human conduct is causally determined.144 There are at least two reasons 
that lead hard incompatibilists to reject the existence of the sort of free will that 
undergirds our judgments of blame and praise. First, if causal determinism is true, 
it would seem that humans lack the ability to do something that seems to be 
essential to their moral responsibility—the capacity to do otherwise or, at the very 
least, the capacity for the agent to be the ultimate source or originator of her 
decision to act in a particular way.145  
Furthermore, proponents of hard incompatibilism argue that free will is 
undermined even if it turns out that human conduct is the product of 
indeterministic processes. They do so by contending that it only makes sense to 
blame or praise us for our acts if we are the ultimate source of the desires, motives 
and intentions that shape our conduct.146 If, however, it turns out that our beliefs, 
intentions, and motives are the product of indeterministic processes that are not 
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governed by causal laws, it would seem that our decisions and acts would be the 
product of random and haphazard events that we cannot control and thus cannot 
ground the sort of freedom that undergirds our judgments of desert.147 
A famous recent argument in favor of the hard incompatibilist claim that 
determinism is incompatible with free will is Derk Pereboom’s “four case 
manipulation argument.”148 The first case put forth in the argument presents us 
with an evil neuroscientist who creates a human that can be manipulated directly 
by radio controls and who is in fact manipulated by the scientist in a way that 
causes him to murder Ms. White.149 In the next case, the neuroscientist creates a 
human who cannot be directly manipulated like in the first case, but who has a 
brain that is programmed in a way that causally determines him to murder Ms. 
White.150 The third case tells the story of an ordinary human who has been 
rigorously trained since he was an infant by his parents and his community in a 
way that causes him to have certain inclinations and character traits that, in turn, 
cause him to murder Ms. White.151 Finally, in the fourth case we have a normal 
human being living in a universe where causal determinism obtains who is caused 
to murder Ms. White as a result of the interplay of events that happened in the past 
(e.g., his upbringing) and the operation of natural laws.152 Pereboom then contends 
that our intuitions strongly suggest that the agent is not responsible in cases one 
and two.153 If so, he argues that, given the similarities between cases two and three, 
and cases three and four, we should also conclude that the agents in cases three and 
four are not responsible, because the ultimate causes of the agent’s action in all of 
these instances can be traced back to events beyond the agent’s control.154 If one 
accepts this conclusion, then causal determinism is incompatible with free will, 
because the agent in case four is like any human being who acts in a causally 
determined universe.155 
 
D.  Compatibilism 
 
The so-called “compatibilists” have staked out an increasingly important 
stance on the free will debate. The adherents of this theory do not deny the 
plausibility of the thesis of causal determinism. As a matter of fact, some 
compatibilists believe that causal determinism is likely true.156 Nevertheless, the 
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compatibilist argument suggests that humans possess the sort of free will that 
underlies judgments of moral responsibility regardless of whether it turns out that 
causal determinism is true.157 As a result, the defenders of compatibilism believe 
that free will is not threatened at all by causal determinism.158 Although 
compatibilists agree that the freedom of will that is needed to justify our practices 
of blaming and punishing is compatible with the truth of causal determinism, there 
is significant disagreement regarding the reasons that justify this conclusion. While 
many compatibilists espouse so-called “mesh” accounts of compatibilism,159 others 
endorse what can be dubbed a “reactive attitudes” account of compatibilism.160 
Furthermore, some theorists refuse to label themselves as “compatibilists” 
although their accounts of free will and its relationship with moral responsibility 
seem to share important features of the compatibilist stance.161 
According to mesh accounts of compatibilism, an actor’s will is free if there is 
an appropriate “mesh or connection” between her choices and her desires and 
preferences.162 Perhaps the most influential mesh account of compatibilism is 
Harry Frankfurt’s.163 The starting point of Frankfurt’s theory is that humans have 
both first and second order volitions.164 First order volitions are volitions to bring 
about an action or a certain state of affairs,165 such as my desire to eat the 
Cheesecake Factory’s sinful red velvet cheesecake. In contrast, second order 
volitions are volitions about first order volitions,166 such as my desire to not desire 
to eat the aforementioned red velvet cheesecake. According to Frankfurt, an actor 
acts freely only if his second order volition is aligned with his first order 
volition,167 such as when I eat the red velvet cheesecake in circumstances in which 
I desire to eat the red velvet cheesecake and I desire to act in accordance with my 
desire to eat the red velvet cheesecake. Contrarily, an actor does not act freely 
when her second order volition is not consistent with her first order volition, such 
as when I eat a red velvet cheesecake that I desired to eat although I did not desire 
to act in accordance with my desire to eat the dessert (because I am on a diet, for 
example).168 Frankfurt’s theory is compatibilist because an agent can act freely 
under her account as long as the actor’s second order volition is connected in a 
certain way with her first order volition (i.e., she eats the cheesecake and she 
desires to act in accordance with her desire to eat the cheesecake) even if she 
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cannot do anything other than what she does in light of the causally determined 
nature of the universe (i.e., she cannot decide to abstain from eating the cake).169 
Several decades ago, P. F. Strawson advanced another influential account of 
compatibilism. Strawson’s theory begins by positing the importance of “reactive 
attitudes” to the human experience.170 Reactive attitudes are reactions that are 
essential to establishing and maintaining personal relationships.171 These reactions 
include, but are not limited to, feelings of resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, 
and love.172 According to Strawson, we act freely and, therefore, are morally 
responsible for our conduct when we behave in a way that generates reactive 
attitudes in others.173 Strawson believes that this type of freedom and moral 
responsibility is not undermined by the truth of causal determinism.174 More 
specifically, he argues that we must continue to assume that humans have free will 
even if determinism obtains.175 Regardless of how scientifically plausible the 
incompatibilist argument may seem, we should not assume that we lack free will, 
for doing so would jeopardize the reactive attitudes and, thus, the kind of 
interpersonal relationships that are essential to our lives.176 
 
E.  Semi-Compatibilism 
 
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza advanced a highly influential solution 
to the free will problem that they dubbed “semicompatibilism.”177 
Semicompatibilism accepts as plausible the view that free will requires access to 
alternative possibilities and that causal determinism is incompatible with free will 
because it negates access to such alternative possibilities.178 Nevertheless, 
semicompatibilists believe that moral responsibility does not require access to 
alternative possibilities and is thus compatible with causal determinism.179 The gist 
of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory is that a person acts in a morally responsible way 
if her conduct is responsive to reason.180 Under this account, compulsives and the 
mentally ill often do not act in a morally responsible manner because they are not 
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responsive to the sort of rational considerations that guide the conduct of the 
majority of humans. Furthermore, Fischer and Ravizza contend that an individual 
is morally responsible for her conduct only if her action is triggered by a decision 
or volition that can be properly characterized as belonging to the agent.181 Thus, 
ascriptions of moral responsibility are warranted in cases where the behavior in 
question was caused by the actor’s own reason-responsive process of deliberation, 
as opposed to it being caused by a non-reason-responsive decisional process (the 
mentally ill) or a reason-responsive deliberative process that does not belong to the 
agent (thought processes induced by hypnosis).182 Finally, Fischer and Ravizza 
argue that these attributions of moral responsibility are justified even if causal 
determinism obtains because determinism is compatible with the view that human 
conduct can be caused by the actor’s reason-responsive thought processes. 
 
IV.  FREE WILL IN CRIMINAL THEORY 
 
As Part II of this Article demonstrates, courts and commentators traditionally 
view free will as essential to criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, many, if not 
most, criminal theorists have little to say about whether our practices of blaming 
and punishing are undermined by the thesis of causal determinism. Of the few 
criminal law scholars who discuss the free will problem, most espouse views that 
mirror the theories of free will and moral responsibility discussed in Part III. Thus, 
some criminal theorists, like George Fletcher, defend a libertarian account of free 
will.183 Others, like Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, and most continental criminal 
scholars, defend a compatibilist account of free will.184 Larry Alexander, for his 
part, mysteriously declares himself to be agnostic with regard to the existence of 
free will and its compatibility with causal determinism. Curiously, though some 
scholars such as Anders Kaye have flirted with hard incompatibilist accounts of 
free will,185 no criminal theorist has comprehensively defended the view that 
causal determinism is likely true and that it is incompatible with free will and 
moral responsibility. This Part seeks to explain, in more detail, the way these and 
other criminal theorists have approached the free will problem. 
 
A.  George Fletcher’s Chomskyan-Inspired Libertarianism 
 
Distinguished criminal law scholar George Fletcher bravely tackled the free 
will problem in his recently published Grammar of Criminal Law.186 The problem 
is discussed in the context of analyzing the nature and scope of the criminal law’s 
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act requirement.187 According to Fletcher, the relevance of free will to criminal law 
is that conduct satisfies the act requirement if, and only if, it is the product of the 
effort or determination of the actor.188 As Fletcher correctly points out, it is 
difficult to defend this way of construing the act requirement if the thesis of causal 
determinism turns out to be true.189 Fletcher appears to be quite troubled by this 
problem, given that conduct is not really the product of the actor’s effort or 
determination if it is fully caused by the interplay of past events and the operation 
of natural laws. Therefore, Fletcher appears to believe that criminal responsibility 
is incompatible with causal determinism. He thus attempts to solve the free will 
problem by arguing that causal determinism is false, at least insofar as it purports 
to explain the inner workings of human behavior.190 
Fletcher advances two arguments that he believes undermine the thesis of 
causal determinism. First, relying on Noam Chomsky’s theory of language, 
Fletcher argues that the number of sentences that we command in natural language 
is infinite.191 This leads him to conclude that human beings could not be 
predetermined or programmed to invent and understand new phrases because the 
number of phrases that could be invented are infinite and thus cannot be 
determined or programmed ex ante.192 Fletcher’s second argument is based on 
John Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.193 The Chinese Room argument 
asks us to imagine a person inside a room with a set of instructions in English that 
allow him to coherently answer questions posed to him in Chinese although he 
does not read or understand Chinese.194 Properly understood, the argument is 
supposed to show that computers that follow algorithms, much like the person 
inside the Chinese room, cannot possibly understand the meaning of the answers it 
provides to the problems with which it is posed.195 Fletcher believes that the 
Chinese room argument casts doubt on the plausibility of the thesis of causal 
determinism because it shows that it cannot be determined in advance that human 
beings understand the meaning of language, because Searle demonstrates that no 
computer could be programmed in advanced to achieve this feat.196 This leads 
Fletcher to conclude that actors are endowed with free will because human conduct 
is unprogrammed, infinitely variable, and thus not causally determined.197 
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B.  Compatibilism in Criminal Theory 
 
1.  Stephen Morse and Michael Moore’s Compatibilism 
 
Stephen Morse is one of only a handful of criminal theorists that have 
seriously tackled the free will problem. His views have proved to be quite 
influential amongst criminal scholars. Morse, unlike Fletcher, believes that causal 
determinism does not threaten free will and criminal responsibility.198 Morse also 
disagrees with Fletcher regarding the plausibility of the thesis of causal 
determinism. While Fletcher believes that causal determinism is likely to be false, 
Morse believes that causal determinism is probably true.199 Nevertheless, Morse 
argues that the sort of free will that is essential to moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism.200 Thus, he defends a compatibilist account of free 
will. Furthermore, Morse argues that most of the criminal law doctrines that are 
currently in place can be recast in compatibilist terms without effecting major 
changes in criminal law jurisprudence.201 
Morse’s compatibilist views closely resemble those espoused by philosopher 
Daniel Dennett. Dennett argues that the sort of freedom that undergirds our 
practices of blaming consists in the ability to give reasons in favor and against 
engaging in a certain conduct.202 Similarly, Morse suggests that the freedom that is 
required by moral responsibility “is dependent primarily on the agent’s general 
capacity to grasp and be guided by reason.”203 Therefore, Morse believes that an 
actor is morally responsible for his choices as long as he has the capacity to be 
guided by reason. Contrarily, he considers that an actor is not responsible if her 
capacity to be guided by reasons is diminished or nonexistent.204 According to 
Morse, the advantage of his account is that it allows us to continue holding people 
morally responsible for their conduct even if it turns out that determinism is true. 
The fact that everything that takes place in the universe is causally determined 
does not impinge upon the uniquely human capacity to rationally mull over our 
choices and plan our conduct accordingly. Thus, Morse suggests that the sort of 
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considerations that undergird his conception of free will, are unaffected by the 
possible truth of determinism.205 
Like Stephen Morse, distinguished criminal theorist Michael Moore believes 
that the sort of free will that undergirds our judgments of praise and blame is 
compatible with determinism.206 Moore begins his defense of compatibilism by 
pointing out that actors should be held responsible for their conduct even if the 
conduct has been caused by factors that the actor does not control—contrary to 
what some criminal scholars have argued.207 He thus suggests that responsibility 
does not hinge on being free from causal processes.208 Rather, he argues that we 
ought to excuse certain conduct whenever it is performed under compulsion.209 
Compulsion differs from causation in that compulsion interferes with one’s 
ability to do what is required by reason and morality, whereas causation produces 
conduct without interfering with the actor’s ability for practical reasoning.210 
Compulsion can be internal, such as a schizophrenic’s compulsion to kill his 
daughter in order to satisfy the will of the voices he hears inside his head. Or it can 
be external, such as when an actor feels compelled to comply with the unlawful 
demands of a gun-wielding assailant in order to keep himself free from harm. 
Moore then suggests that actors are morally responsible for their acts as long as 
they are not the product of compulsion, even if forces that actors cannot control 
cause the acts.211 At first glance, this account of moral responsibility is compatible 
with the truth of causal determinism, because responsibility would depend on the 
absence of compulsion rather than on the absence of causation. 
Although Moore places much emphasis on the distinction between causation 
and compulsion, he acknowledges that the distinction is not in and of itself enough 
to disprove the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. 
More specifically, Moore admits that there is a strong intuition that an actor is 
responsible only if he could have acted otherwise and that the truth of causal 
determinism calls into question whether humans actually have this ability.212 
Moore’s response to this objection borrows much from Strawson’s “reactive 
attitudes” account of compatibilism.213 Moore agrees with Strawson’s contention 
that reactive attitudes such as blame, praise, resentment, and gratitude are an 
                                                 
205 See id. at 439. 
206 Moore, supra note 11, at 1140 (stating that “people can exercise their will even 
though their actions are caused”). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1129–30. 
211 Id. at 1132. 
212 Id. at 1141 (stating that “[e]ven after the conceptual confusions are cleared away, 
the causal theorist has a moral argument: if a person could not help doing what he did, he is 
not morally responsible for it. This is true even if his behavior was an action, and an action 
not covered by the conventional moral excuses”). 
213 See supra notes 170–176 and accompanying text. 
1432 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 4 
essential part of the human experience.214 These attitudes are so essential to our 
lives that they give meaning to most of our valuable interpersonal relationships, 
including those that we have with our children and friends.215 Furthermore, Moore 
believes that reactive attitudes play an important role in guiding our behavior.216 
Forsaking such attitudes would thus lead to falsifying much of our moral life. As a 
result, Moore contends that we should not renounce to the sort of free will that 
makes experiencing these attitudes possible, even if it turns out that the thesis of 
causal determinism is true.217 
 
2.  Compatibilism in Continental Criminal Theory 
 
Like their Anglo-American counterparts, many continental criminal law 
scholars acknowledge that the plausibility of the thesis of causal determinism 
threatens to undermine the kind of freedom that undergirds conventional theories 
of criminal responsibility. Claus Roxin—one of Europe’s leading criminal 
theorists—believes that he has found a way out of the free will problem. Roxin 
argues that an individual acts freely, and is thus morally and criminally liable, 
when he is in a position to understand and take into account the applicable legal 
rules that are intended to govern his conduct.218 Furthermore, he argues that we 
ought to assume—without being able to prove—that the individual who is in such 
a position is also able to conform his conduct to the mandates of the law.219 This, 
however, does not mean that Roxin argues for an indeterminist account of freedom 
of will and responsibility.220 As a matter of fact, Roxin believes that his view is 
compatible with determinist accounts of human conduct.221 More specifically, he 
suggests that whether humans are capable of acting otherwise is irrelevant to his 
views on freedom and responsibility because actors who are capable of 
understanding and taking into account applicable legal rules are treated as if they 
were free to act otherwise, regardless of whether they were actually capable of 
doing so.222 Thus, Roxin contends that assuming that humans are endowed with the 
freedom to choose amongst alternative courses of action is socially valuable 
regardless of whether epistemological or scientific inquiry casts doubt on whether 
such a faculty actually exists.223 
Another compatibilist account of free will, influential amongst continental 
criminal theorists, is the one advanced by Gunther Jakobs. Jakobs’ compatibilist 
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argument shares several important features with Daniel Dennett’s compatibilism. 
Jakobs, like Dennett, believes that the usefulness of certain concepts depends on 
their effectiveness in explaining, understanding, and predicting the behavior of a 
given system.224 More specifically, Jakobs argues that free will is relevant to 
responsibility only insofar as it is practical and useful for law and society to 
presuppose that humans are free in a special sort of way.225 Jakobs then posits that 
the freedom to be unencumbered from causal processes is not essential to our 
judgments about blame and responsibility.226 However, he argues that being free 
from extraordinary causal influences, such as serious human threats and mental 
defects is essential to our practices of blaming and punishing.227 Therefore, he 
suggests that judgments about moral responsibility are dependent on being free 
from certain compulsions, but not dependent on being free from causal 
processes.228 As a result, Jakobs concludes that the sort of free will that is relevant 
to moral responsibility is not threatened by the truth of causal determinism.229 
 
C.  Agnostic Stances Toward the Problem of Free Will in Criminal Law 
 
In a recently published book, Larry Alexander seems to reject the 
compatibilist solution to the free will problem in favor of what seems to be an 
agnostic stance with regard to the issue. More specifically, he claims that 
“compatibilism provides only a hollow form of moral responsibility, not the full-
blooded form that our reactive attitudes assume.”230 What Alexander finds 
particularly troubling about the compatibilism advocated by scholars like Morse 
and Dennett is that, if determinism obtains, it would seem that what appears to the 
actor to be a “reason” for engaging in a certain act is actually caused by forces that 
the actor cannot control.231 He contends, “we are incapable of resolving” the “free 
                                                 
224 Thus, for example, Dennett argues that there are good reasons to treat two chess 
programs that are competing against each other as “agents” that are capable of acting in 
different ways and of harboring “beliefs” about what the other will do. We have good 
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generally DENNETT, supra note 156, at 81. 
225 See generally Günther Jakobs, Individuo y persona. Sobre la imputación jurídico-
penal y los resultados de la moderna investigación neurológica, in RAFAEL ALCÁCER 
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will-determinism puzzle” and that the specter of determinism “will always dog 
[our] practices of holding people morally responsible.”232 However, he believes 
that “we cannot imagine dispensing with” our practices of blaming and 
punishing.233 Given that we cannot live without such practices, he concludes “a 
retributivist regarding criminal punishment need not resolve or even take sides on 
the free will issue.”234 Alexander then summarizes his position by claiming in a 
somewhat mysterious fashion that “we cannot . . . comprehend the bases of moral 
responsibility” because “neither determinism nor indeterminism can provide a 
satisfactory account of moral responsibility, and together they appear to exhaust 
the possibilities.”235 Nevertheless, he posits that we cannot renounce to judgments 
about blame and praise because “we cannot comprehend the possibility that we are 
not morally responsible.”236 
In his book on the philosophy of criminal law, Douglas Husak also seems to 
adopt an agnostic stance to the free will problem. There, Husak argues that the gist 
of the criminal law’s act requirement cannot mean that an actor should only be 
held liable for engaging in “acts.”237 The act requirement, Husak suggests, cannot 
stand for this proposition because actors are routinely held liable for non-acts such 
as omissions and for certain states of affairs such as public drunkenness.238 
Therefore, he claims that what the criminal law’s act requirement really means is 
that it is unfair to hold an actor liable for acts, results, or states of affair that he 
cannot control.239 Husak thus contends that the criminal law should abandon the 
act requirement in favor of what he calls the “control principle.”240 One obvious 
objection to Husak’s control principle is that if determinism obtains, an actor 
should never be held liable for anything, given that in a causally determined world 
human behavior is ultimately caused by factors over which the individual lacks 
control. To his credit, Husak acknowledges the problem in his book.241 
Nevertheless, he ends up dismissing the problem by asserting “though perhaps 
disappointingly little is said here” about how determinism might undermine the 
control principle, “I hope that the notion of control is able to withstand the great 
intuitive weight I place upon it.” 242 
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D.  Hard Incompatibilism and Criminal Theory 
 
For reasons that remain unclear, hard incompatibilism has barely found its 
way into the writings of contemporary criminal scholars. Only Michael Corrado 
has expressly endorsed the hard incompatibilist position, although he has yet to 
comprehensively defend his position against the attacks leveled by compatibilists 
and libertarians.243 Additionally, a handful of criminal theorists defend a particular 
account of excuse defenses that is influenced by some of the arguments that hard 
incompatibilists often advance. This account is known as the “causal theory of 
excuses.”244 According to the causal theory of excuses, a defendant ought to be 
excused for engaging in wrongful conduct if his conduct was caused by factors 
outside the actor’s control.245 This view stems from two deeply held intuitions. 
First, it assumes that it is intuitively unfair to blame an actor for acts that are not 
“up to him.” Second, it assumes that it is unjust to blame an actor for performing a 
certain act if he lacked the capacity to do otherwise. 
Supporters of the causal theory of excuses have a tough time accepting the 
implications that causal determinism would have for their theory. As has been 
mentioned, the truth of causal determinism means that human conduct is caused by 
the combination of natural laws and events that have taken place in the past.246 
Humans lack control over both natural laws and the past. Therefore, the truth of 
causal determinism inevitably leads to the conclusion that human conduct is the 
product of factors over which we lack control. Given that defenders of the causal 
theory of excuses believe that conduct caused by factors the actor cannot control 
should not be punished, the truth of causal determinism should lead them to reject 
free will and with it the practice of blaming people for their evil acts.247 Causal 
theorists have resisted the implications of this argument. Most, like Anders Kaye, 
have done so by refusing to fully accept the thesis of causal determinism.248 Kaye’s 
position is inspired, at least in part, by the plausibility of certain libertarian 
accounts of human behavior249 and, therefore, his approach to determinism appears 
to be a brand of libertarianism cloaked in (partial) determinist clothing. 
                                                 
243 See, e.g., Michael L. Corrado, The Abolition of Punishment, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 257, 265 n.20 (2001) (stating that “[i]f you accept the plausibility of determinism, 
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V.  THE FREE WILL MAZE AS A DIALECTICAL STALEMATE AND WHERE WE GO 
FROM HERE 
 
As we have seen, philosophers and criminal theorists have come up with 
different ways of tackling the free will problem. Both libertarians and hard 
incompatibilists believe that causal determinism is incompatible with free will and 
moral responsibility. Libertarians, however, believe that humans do in fact have 
free will because human behavior can be traced back to indeterministic processes. 
Hard incompatibilists, on the other hand, argue that humans lack free will and 
moral responsibility even if human conduct is the product of indeterministic forces. 
Compatibilists do not deny that causal determinism is plausible. However, unlike 
hard incompatibilists and libertarians, they argue that free will is compatible with 
determinism. Although each of these views has some appealing attributes, 
important objections can be leveled against all three. The purpose of this Part is to 
briefly examine various objections to each of these theories in order to assess the 
current state of the free will debate and propose a way forward. 
 
A.  The Problems with Libertarianism 
 
The most sophisticated account of libertarianism is the one defended by 
Anders Kane who, in typical libertarian fashion, accepts that free will is 
incompatible with determinism, but rejects the truth of causal determinism.250 The 
challenge for Kane is to find a scientifically plausible account of human behavior 
that can be traced back to indeterministic processes.251 While Kane’s Herculean 
attempt to explain human conduct by appealing to indeterministic quantum 
mechanic processes in the brain252 is creative, it raises two serious problems. First, 
the indeterministic processes that undergird quantum mechanics are random.253 
This is problematic, for it would be odd to conclude that it is fair to hold an 
individual morally responsible for conduct that is ultimately the product of random 
or haphazard events. Thus, random causation is as much a threat to freedom of will 
and moral responsibility as determinism is.254 Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, there is simply no scientific evidence supporting Kane’s account of 
quantum mechanics in the brain. As Henrik Walter observes, “to date there is no 
                                                 
250 See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
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solid empirical evidence that local quantum phenomena play a role in neurons, 
[whereas] there are good arguments to the contrary.”255 
The most recent criminal law theorist to defend libertarianism is George 
Fletcher. Fletcher believes that Noam Chomsky’s showing that we command an 
infinite number of sentences in natural language demonstrates that human conduct 
is not causally determined.256 More specifically, he argues that it would be 
impossible to program a computer to create terms the programmer has never heard 
before and, therefore, it is unlikely that human beings could be determined to 
invent new words in a language.257 However, Fletcher’s use of Chomsky as his 
poster boy for indeterminism is particularly odd, because other philosophers 
invoke Chomsky’s theory of language as an argument in favor of the so-called 
computational theory of mind.258  
According to the computational theory of mind, the best way of thinking 
about the human mind is as an information processing system (i.e., a 
computer)259 and the best way of thinking of the concept of thought is as a kind of 
computation.260 Chomskyan linguistics lends credence to the computational theory 
of mind because what accounts for the infinite variability of language that Fletcher 
finds so interesting is the human capacity for “recursion.”261 Recursion is nothing 
more than a particular type of computation that consists of taking discrete elements 
(e.g., phrases) and recombining them in a way that can potentially yield infinite 
combinations (e.g., infinite sentences).262 Of course, given that recursion is a kind 
of computation, there would be nothing odd about a sufficiently powerful 
computer that can recombine a discrete set of words and phrases in a way that 
produces infinite utterances. Therefore, rather than demonstrating that human 
language cannot be the product of computation or of some algorithmic program, 
Chomskyan linguistics tend to show that the human capacity for language can be 
reduced to a discrete set of rules that operate in recursive fashion to create an 
infinite amount of utterances. As a result, contrary to what Fletcher suggests, 
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Chomsky’s theory of language reinforces the thesis of causal determinism instead 
of jeopardizing it. 
Fletcher also believes that John Searle’s Chinese Room argument shows that 
human conduct is likely not causally determined.263 Fletcher argues that “if the use 
of language were determined by algorithms in the brain,” we would conduct 
ourselves in much the same manner as the individual inside the Chinese Room and 
would thus be unable to understand what we’re saying.264 Since we clearly 
understand what we’re saying, it follows that we are not determined to act by 
algorithms in the brain. The chief objection to Fletcher’s use of the Chinese Room 
argument as a vehicle for demonstrating the falsity of determinism is that the 
Searle’s argument is not designed to demonstrate that human conduct is not 
causally determined. Searle devised the argument in order to show that computers, 
unlike humans, are not capable of understanding meaning.265 Even if this 
conclusion is accepted,266 it does not follow from the fact that humans are not 
computers that human conduct is not causally determined. The basic flaw in 
Fletcher’s argument is that it incorrectly assumes that all causally determined 
beings take the form of a computer. Thus, as Stephen Morse correctly points out, 
Fletcher’s argument ultimately fails because “[c]omputers are not the only 
deterministic mechanisms on earth, and Fletcher fails to confront the possibility 
that computer programs cannot fully simulate the capacity of natural selection to 
develop new, nonmysterious and deterministic forms, such as brains capable of 
understanding meaning.”267 
 
B.  The Problems with Compatibilism 
 
1. Basic Objections to Standard Accounts of Compatibilisim Referred to as 
“Mesh” and “Reactive Attitudes” Compatibilism 
 
Frankfurt claims that the sort of free will that undergirds judgments of blame 
and praise merely requires that there be an appropriate “mesh” or link between 
certain inclinations and desires of the actor.268 More specifically, Frankfurt 
suggests that an actor acts freely if his first and second order volitions are 
connected in the right kind of way (i.e., the actor desires to desire eating the red 
velvet cheesecake).269 This solution is elegant because it allows for the possibility 
of free will and moral responsibility even if it turns out that we are causally 
determined to act in a certain manner (to eat the red velvet cheesecake, for 
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example). The problem with Frankfurt’s solution is that causal determinism 
threatens not only the control humans have over their actions, but also the control 
they have over their motives, intents, and desires.270 Therefore, if causal 
determinism is true, it follows that the interplay of the past and natural laws 
determines not only our conduct, but also our desires. Given that we lack control 
over the past and the natural laws, it follows that if determinism obtains we would 
lack control over both our conduct and our first, second, and Nth order volitions. 
Once we accept that in a causally determined universe humans lack control over 
both their conduct and their volitions, it is difficult to see why the actor’s volitions 
make him responsible in a robust sense for what he does. As a result, mesh 
accounts of compatibilism, like Frankfurt’s, do not seem to provide the sort of free 
will that supports judgments of moral responsibility. Since an actor’s responsibility 
seems to be a product not only of his capacity to act otherwise, but also of his 
capacity to desire otherwise—both of these capacities are threatened by 
determinism. 
P.F. Strawson attempts to avoid objections to mesh theories of compatibilism 
with this proposition: we must assume that humans are endowed with free will, 
regardless of the truth of determinism, because not doing so would lead to 
abandoning many reactive attitudes (regret, resentment, blame, praise, love, etc.) 
that are essential to healthy interpersonal relationships.271 Strawson’s argument is 
thus more normative than metaphysical.272 Ultimately, his claim is not that we 
actually have such a thing as free will, but rather that human and societal life is 
more appealing if we assume we have free will regardless of whether we actually 
do have it.273 Certainly, Strawson is right that some reactive attitudes, such as the 
kind of blame that undergirds theories of retribution, would have to be jettisoned if 
we lack free will. However, it is unclear whether reactive attitudes are actually 
essential to interpersonal relationships. Even if they are, it is unclear whether 
assuming that we lack free will would jeopardize the reactive attitudes that are 
most essential to human life. As will be discussed in Part VI of this article, we 
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experience many of the most cherished reactive attitudes, including love, 
admiration, and praise, regardless of whether we believe that the actor who is 
loved, praised, or admired is endowed with free will.274 Thus, most of us would 
continue loving our children, admiring Liz Taylor’s beautiful violet eyes, and 
praising Ussain Bolt for running a hundred meters in less than 9.69 seconds, even 
if we believed that our children have not yet developed the sort of character or 
rationality that undergirds free will, that Liz Taylor did not freely choose to have 
violet eyes, and that Ussain Bolt’s freakish speed is more a product of his genes 
than his training. It is thus uncertain that Strawson is right when he claims that a 
life without free will is not possible or desirable. 
 
2. The Problems with Reasons-Centered Accounts of Compatibilism (and Semi-
Compatibilism) 
 
As we have seen, semicompatibilists like John Martin Fischer believe that 
determinism is incompatible with free will, while it is compatible with moral 
responsibility.275 For Fischer, an actor is morally responsible if his conduct could 
be guided by reasons, and the reasons that move him into action belong to him 
rather than to another.276 The flaws with Fischer’s account of moral responsibility 
are similar to the flaws inherent in Frankfurt’s mesh account of compatibilism. If 
causal determinism is true, it follows that everything that happens in the world, 
including human conduct, human desires, and a human’s responsiveness to 
reasons is caused by factors over which he lacks control.277 It is unclear whether an 
actor should be blamed or praised for engaging in conduct that is the product of a 
reason-responsive process of deliberation when it is assumed that the very process 
of deliberation was determined by factors over which the actor lacked control. It is 
sensible to argue that an actor is morally responsible for his acts if, and only if, the 
process of deliberation that caused his conduct originated in the actor rather than in 
some causal force over which the actor has no control.278 In other words, it is 
reasonable to assume that an actor is morally responsible for his conduct only if he 
was in control of the deliberative process that caused him to act. Determinism 
implies that actors do not control the deliberative processes that generate their 
conduct. Thus, it may be argued that the question of whether the actor is in fact 
responsive to reasons in a particular case lacks the moral significance that Fischer 
attaches to it, because the actor does not control the deliberative process. 
Like Fischer, compatibilist criminal theorists believe that if an actor has the 
capacity for rationality, then he also has the sort of free will that undergirds 
judgments of blame and praise.279 These arguments can be criticized on the same 
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grounds that are employed on Fischer’s semicompatibilism arguments.280 Moore 
and Morse, however, attempt to sidestep these objections by deploying a reductio 
ad absurdum argument. They argue that if humans can only be blamed for conduct 
that is the product of factors that they control, then it follows that humans can 
never be blamed for anything, given that causal determinism implies that all 
human conduct is the product of forces that we cannot control.281 And they claim it 
would be unpalatable to conclude that everyone ought to be excused for their 
transgressions.282 The problem with this sort of maneuver is that, like Strawson’s 
reactive attitudes compatibilism, it presupposes that if we lack the capacity to be 
held morally responsible for our acts, this leads to an impoverished view of 
societal life that would “falsify much of our moral li[ves.]”283 Moore and Morse 
(and Strawson) overstate their case, because (as argued previously) it is not clear 
that assuming a lack of free will would lead to the sort of life that is not worth 
living. Furthermore, accepting that everyone ought to be “excused” from 
wrongdoing in a retributive sense does not entail that no one ought to be 
“punished” or “incarcerated.” As will be discussed in Part VII, there are good 
consequentialist reasons to punish or incarcerate people even if they do not 
“deserve” to suffer in the sense that Morse and Moore imply. 
 
3. The Problems with Pragmatic or Functionalist Accounts of Compatibilism 
 
Daniel Dennett and Gunther Jakobs argue that it is useful to talk about 
concepts like free will only if doing so helps us better understand and explain the 
behavior of a particular being or entity.284 Thus, we ought to abstain from talking 
about the free will of ants or rocks because there is nothing to gain in terms of 
explanatory and predictive power. However, it is perfectly sensible and rational to 
talk about the free will of humans, because doing so helps us to better understand 
societal practices of blaming and punishing and the way in which humans interact 
with each other.285 This approach to free will and moral responsibility views the 
problem of free will as a pragmatic one that should not be obfuscated by asking 
unanswerable metaphysical questions, such as whether humans actually have free 
will. Ultimately, it is unimportant whether humans have metaphysical free will; 
what really matters is whether there is something to gain by assuming that they are, 
in fact, endowed with free will.286  
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The problem with this argument is that many people do in fact care about 
whether we actually have the ability to control our conduct and the desires and 
reasons that shape our behavior. For those who do care about this sort of thing, 
determinism threatens to undermine free will and moral responsibility. Whether it 
would be efficient or pragmatic to ignore this is irrelevant. While there may be 
something to be gained from adopting a pragmatic approach to questions related to 
free will, those who believe that judgments of blame are unjust if humans do not 
have actual access to alternate possibilities will not change their minds simply 
because it would be efficient to presume that they do have the capacity to choose 
amongst alternative courses of action. 
 
C.  The Problems with Hard Incompatibilism 
 
Many hard incompatibilists believe both that determinism is true and that it is 
incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. This kind of hard 
incompatibilism can be challenged on two fronts. First, it is unclear whether causal 
determinism fully explains human behavior. It is true that there are scientific 
experiments that suggest that human conduct is causally determined by factors 
over which we lack control,287 but it is also true that these experiments are limited 
in their scope and the precise way in which the mind works is still very much 
unknown.288 Furthermore, even if it is accepted for argument’s sake that 
determinism is true, it is possible that the sort of freedom that is essential for moral 
responsibility is compatible with a deterministic understanding of the universe and 
of human behavior. If there are, as many philosophers and legal scholars seem to 
believe, accounts of human conduct that are compatible both with determinism and 
with ascriptions of blame and praise, why hijack the free will edifice upon which 
our practices of blaming and punishing are built, simply because it is not 
incoherent to hold that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral 
responsibility? After all, as Stephen Morse suggests, we may have good reason to 
reject hard incompatibilism “[if] compatibilism is consistent with our 
responsibility practices and their centrality, and [if] there is [not] and cannot be any 
incontrovertible theoretical or empirical reason to reject it . . . . ”289 Thus, although 
“there may be good empirical and normative reasons to reform various 
responsibility doctrines and practices . . . there is no metaphysical reason 
concerning free will to abandon them entirely.”290 
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287 See, e.g., Libet, supra note 8, at 640. 
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D.  The Free Will Problem as a Dialectical Stalemate 
 
This brief survey of the proposed solutions to the free will problem—and the 
objections that can be leveled at the different solutions—demonstrates at least 
three things. First, causal determinism threatens to undermine free will and 
proponents of free will (libertarians) thus need to put forth a theory that can 
explain either why free will is compatible with determinism or why determinism is 
likely false. Second, some theorists (compatibilists) have in fact come up with 
plausible theories that purport to demonstrate how free will and determinism can 
coexist, whereas others (libertarians) have come up with plausible theories that 
explain why determinism might be false. Third, serious objections can be directed 
both at the incompatibilist (including libertarian and hard incompatibilist theories) 
and compatibilist solutions to the free will problem. As a result, it seems that the 
free will problem has the argumentative structure John Martin Fischer called a 
“dialectical stalemate.”291  
The seeds of a dialectical stalemate are planted whenever someone puts forth 
a controversial claim and supports his argument by “invoking a set of examples (or 
other considerations)” that demonstrate that his claim ought to be accepted.292 The 
dialectical stalemate germinates when an opponent reasonably asserts that one 
could “embrace all the examples” (and other considerations) in the proponent’s 
argument without having to accept the proponent’s claim.293 Thus, as Hillary Bok 
explains, we have reached a dialectical stalemate  
 
when no arguments based on appeals to ordinary language, to the 
consideration of examples, or to our intuitions succeed in convincing our 
opponents, and when this is due not to our opponents’ limitations but to 
the fact that both sides can appeal to intuitions, accounts of apparent 
counterexamples, and claims about our ordinary use of the terms in 
question that are not unreasonable.294 
 
Once the notion of a dialectical stalemate is grasped, it is easy to see why the 
free will problem presents the “signature structure” of such argumentative 
deadlocks.295 Libertarians and hard incompatibilists share the intuition that an actor 
lacks the free will that calls for moral responsibility, and the intuition that 
determinism implies that humans lack control over their actions. Compatibilists 
reply in one of two ways. Some offer the competing intuition that in many cases 
moral responsibility is grounded on something other than the capacity to control 
                                                 
291 FISCHER, supra note 38, at 112–17. 
292 Id. at 112–13. 
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294 HILLARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 99 (1998). 
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actions, such as the appropriate connection between the actor’s first and second 
order volitions.296  
Others argue that even if determinism obtains, humans can act otherwise—for 
any given actor could act otherwise if he wants to, because even if determinism is 
true, an actor’s desires do exert causal force over the actor’s conduct.297 Therefore, 
as Hillary Bok points out, 
 
both [incompatibilists] and compatibilists draw on important features of 
our ordinary concept of freedom, both are trying to apply that concept to 
cases in which the conditions of its straightforward application are 
absent, both project that concept in ways that are not obviously 
unreasonable or illegitimate, and both can muster real intuitive support 
for their views.298  
 
Consequently, the free will problem presents a genuine dialectical stalemate, given 
that “no appeal to our ordinary concept of freedom, or to the ways in which we 
ordinarily apply it, will settle the issue between [incompatibilists] and 
compatibilists, since that concept supports both views and does not give us 
decisive grounds to reject either.”299 More importantly, if the problem of free will 
truly generates this dialectical stalemate, incompatibilists and compatibilists should 
agree that both solutions to the free will problem “have something to be said for 
them [and] can usefully be employed in various circumstances.”300 They should 
also agree that neither claim is likely “to be established by arguments about what 
[ordinary terms mean], by appeal to our ordinary concept of freedom or by our 
intuitions.”301 
 
E.  The Way Out of the Dialectical Stalemate Generated by the Free Will Problem 
 
What should criminal scholars do in light of this dialectical stalemate? We 
could throw our hands up in despair and candidly acknowledge, as Larry 
Alexander has, that the free will problem is intractable and one that “we are 
incapable of resolving.”302 This strikes me as the wrong way to respond to a 
dialectical stalemate. As John Martin Fischer has persuasively argued, these 
stalemates should not issue in “philosophical despair,” nor should they “result in 
our inability to make any philosophical progress or to come to any useful 
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philosophical conclusions.”303 When faced with these stalemates, we should 
“abandon the attempt to convince our opponents that intuitions, examples, or 
ordinary language decisively favor our view, not only because such arguments are 
unlikely to convince them[,] but because the fact that we have reached a genuine 
dialectical stalemate shows that such arguments are unsound.”304 And we should 
“admit that there are several apparently legitimate ways” of solving the problem 
and that each of these solutions is prima facie plausible.305 Once we do so, we 
ought to stop focusing on whether free will really or actually means this or that, or 
whether moral responsibility does or does not presuppose access to alternative 
possibilities. Rather, we should ask ourselves whether we have better normative 
reasons for adopting the compatibilist over the incompatibilist stance or vice versa.  
In other words, the best way out of the dialectical stalemate is not by 
considering which of the competing accounts of free will is closer to the 
metaphysical truth of the matter (because we simply do not know what the truth of 
this matter is), but rather by considering the normative question related to which of 
these competing conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility produces a more 
appealing life in general and a more desirable criminal law in particular. 
 
VI.  WHY LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL IS NOT AS BAD AS IT SEEMS 
 
Before deciding whether there are good normative reasons for us to hold on 
toor abandonfree will, we first need to envision what a world without free will 
would look like. Would we want to live in such a world or would we rather live in 
a world in which we assume that others are endowed with free will? For most of 
the philosophers and criminal theorists who have confronted the question, the 
answer seems obvious. A life without free will is like a garden without flowers. 
Assuming that our fellow humans lack free will and the capacity to be held morally 
responsible for their acts leads to an impoverished view of human life.306 The 
purpose of this Part is to show that this conventional account of what a world 
without free will would look like is wrong in very significant ways. It seems that 
these bleak assessments of the consequences of assuming that we have no free will 
are driven by the philosopher’s desperate desire to hang on to the free will edifice 
that we have built over thousands of years. Ultimately, however, this Part claims 
that the normative case against free will is overstated, that there is no need to fear 
living in a world without free will, and that assuming that humans lack free will 
can actually have salutary consequences in some cases. 
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A.  The Conventional Claim: Living Without Free Will Is Utterly Unappealing 
 
1.  Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes Argument 
 
P.F. Strawson argues that we ought to assume that humans are endowed with 
free will because to do the opposite undermines the reactive attitudes.307 As 
discussed earlier, reactive attitudes are attitudes that are important in defining and 
maintaining our interpersonal and societal relationships.308 For Strawson, a life 
lived without reactive attitudes is barely a life worth living.309 After all, what 
would a life be without receiving praise for doing well and blaming those who do 
badly? What would a life be without being able to love those who are good to us 
and resent those who are mean to us? The answer is clear to Strawson: living such 
a life is unpalatable and ought to be avoided at all costs.310 If the price of not 
falling prey to such a life is to assume that we have free will in the face of causal 
determinism, so be it. 
Strawson believes that assuming that we do not have free will jeopardizes not 
only the enjoyment of individual lives, but also the wellbeing of society as a 
whole.311 Reactive attitudes are thought to be essential to justifying many societal 
practices. Perhaps the most obvious practices that are justified on the basis of 
certain reactive attitudes are practices of blaming and punishing.312 Religious 
practices also seem to be undergirded by certain reactive attitudes. Judgments of 
blame and praise play an essential role in Judeo-Christian religions. For example, 
for the Judeo-Christian tradition, a person who unjustifiably violates one of the 
Ten Commandments behaves in a blameworthy manner. Desert-based judgments 
are thus essential to understanding certain basic aspects of these religions. 
Furthermore, even more mundane practices, such as governmental awarding of 
“merit scholarships” and public recognition of achievements by way of prizes and 
awards, seem to lose meaning in a world without free will. After all, if there is no 
free will, what’s the point of rewarding people for doing what they could not have 
abstained from doing? By the same token, if there is no free will, what’s the point 
of blaming people for doing things that they could not have done differently? 
Strawson argues that these practices would be pointless if we assume that there is 
no free will and this, in turn, provides us with a normative argument against hard 
incompatibilist approaches to the free will problem.313 
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2.  Michael Moore’s “Falsifying Our Moral Life” Argument 
 
Michael Moore has also assessed the normative implications of assuming that 
humans lack free will.314 For him, the problem with denying free will is that doing 
so is inconsistent with our practices of blaming and punishing, praising, and 
rewarding. Like Strawson, Moore claims that our practices of blaming and praising 
are essential to moral life.315 Without assuming that we are endowed with the sort 
of freedom that undergirds such practices we could not do things that we would 
like to do, such as praising (or blaming) Andy Warhol for immortalizing Campbell 
Soup cans in a work of art or commending Michael Moore for writing an excellent 
article about free will. Moore finds it hard to imagine what our practices of 
praising and blaming would look like if we assume that humans lack free will, 
although it seems obvious that he believes that such practices would be much less 
appealing if we were to make this assumption. While Moore concedes that the hard 
incompatibilist might adopt a “tough it out” attitude and claim that most of our 
moral experience is false in light of the truth of causal determinism, he believes 
that we have good reasons to avoid doing this.316 Moore proposes that the hard 
incompatibilist position ought to be rejected, not because it can be proven false, 
but rather because it cannot be proven true and he asks if the implications of 
accepting the position would “falsify much of our moral life.”317 As a result, 
Moore concludes that we ought to reject hard incompatibilism and accept 
compatibilism. 
 
3.  The Attitudes that Must Be Abandoned in a World Without Free Will Are Not 
Essential to Maintaining Healthy Relationships 
 
Strawson is probably right when he claims that some attitudes would have to 
be abandoned in a world without free will. He is also right when he claims, along 
with Moore, that it would no longer make sense to genuinely blame those who 
engage in wrongdoing and praise those who engage in morally commendable 
behavior. Nevertheless, Strawson overstates his case when he suggests that living 
without such attitudes is unpalatable or that the absence of such reactive attitudes 
is detrimental to societal life. Similarly, Moore exaggerates when he proposes that 
the loss of certain attitudes, such as blame, would “falsify much of our moral 
li[ves].”318 While Strawson and Moore argue that feelings of blame are healthy 
both at individual and collective scales, there are good reasons to believe 
otherwise. Blame usually engenders resentment and indignation, which, in turn, 
might generate a strong desire for vengeance and an unrelenting quest for 
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revenge.319 While perhaps feelings of blame are not objectionable per se, there are 
many good reasons to object to vengeance and revenge. Vengeance and revenge 
are viewed as “angry” responses to crime that are derived more from a “lust for 
blood” than from a rational and careful consideration of the pros and cons of 
punishing the individual.320 Thus, abandoning feelings of blame might lead to a 
less vengeful and violent society, which, of course, would be a salutary 
development.  
It is also important to note that many of our most fulfilling relationships are 
entirely devoid of feelings of blame. Most people love to interact with children 
despite the fact that they cannot be genuinely blamed or praised for doing what 
they do.321 Not only that, but it would seem that we prize such interactions at least 
in part precisely because we can easily shrug off transgressions committed by 
children by simply assuming that they could not do otherwise. Far from reducing 
the value of our experiences with children, this actually allows us to enjoy our time 
with them more, for we feel free to love children without judging them.  
Similarly, most people cherish their pets although animals are clearly 
incapable of free will and thus of being genuinely responsible for their acts. In 
spite of this, we love spending time with our dogs and cats and very much 
appreciate their displays of affection and disregard their transgressions without 
caring about whether they can be genuinely praised for curling next to us or 
blamed for biting our leg. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that experiencing 
“genuine” feelings of blame and praise is not a prerequisite to having fulfilling and 
meaningful relationships with others. When this is combined with the fact that 
feelings of blame can and often do degenerate in unhealthy desires for vengeance 
and revenge, Strawson and Moore’s conclusion that blame is essential to a life 
worth living seems far from compelling. 
There are, of course, certain attitudes that could not be abandoned without 
dealing a fatal blow to some of the most cherished experiences in human life. The 
obvious example is love. It is difficult to imagine what a world not capable of 
loving would look like. Strawson seems to suggest that even our feelings of love 
would be threatened if we were to assume that we lack free will.322 Once again, it 
seems that Strawson overstates his case. As was discussed in the preceding 
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paragraph, we love children and pets although we accept that they lack free will.323 
Furthermore, we would continue to love our children even if scientists demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that our love for them is entirely hardwired into our 
brains. By the same token, we would continue to love our parents, spouses, and 
friends even if someone showed us that we did not freely choose to love them or 
that they did not they freely choose to love us in return.324 
Feelings of admiration are also very important to the human experience. It 
would be a bleak life indeed if no one would ever acknowledge our 
accomplishments. Moore believes that just like there is no room for blame, there is 
no space for praise in a world without free will.325 Although it is unclear whether 
we must stop praising people if we assume that we lack free will, it is manifestly 
clear that we need not stop admiring them. We admired Liz Taylor’s violet eyes—
and she undoubtedly enjoyed such admiration—although we were aware that she 
did not freely choose the coloration of her iris. Similarly, we admire the Grammy 
award winning singer Adele’s incredible voice even though we know that her 
vocal abilities are innate. Furthermore, we would continue to admire Ussain Bolt 
for being the fastest person on earth and to complement Michael Moore for his 
enormous contributions to legal theory even if we believed that they are able to do 
what they do only because they were lucky to have been born with certain physical 
and intellectual attributes. In sum, it appears that we often seek admiration and that 
we can admire humans for their traits and acts regardless of whether they have the 
ability to control their traits or acts. 
 
4.  The Existence and Usefulness of Morality Is Not Threatened by Assuming that 
We Lack Free Will 
 
Another argument against the hard incompatibilist position is that its adoption 
might lead to eschewing moral judgments. This is an important objection. Moral 
rules are a fundamental feature of societal life. A theory that leads to the rejection 
of morality thus fails to make sense of an essential facet of our lives. This 
argument against hard incompatibilism exploits a perceived connection between 
judgments about blame and judgments about morality. The point of departure of 
the argument is that if humans lack free will they cannot be genuinely blamed for 
their acts. The next step is to argue that judgments about the morality of engaging 
in certain acts are devoid of meaning if one accepts the proposition that ascriptions 
of blame for engaging in these acts are unwarranted. After all, if it does not make 
sense to blame an actor for doing “X,” is it not also the case that it does not make 
sense to conclude that the actor behaved immorally when doing “X”? 
Despite its intuitive appeal, this argument ought to be rejected because it fails 
to distinguish between two very different rules. More specifically, the argument 
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conflates rules that govern the attribution of culpability with rules that proscribe 
wrongful conduct. Failing to distinguish between these two kinds of rules is 
problematic, given that it is possible to have wrongdoing without culpability. An 
act is wrongful if it is prohibited by a given system of norms (moral, legal, 
religious, and so forth).326 On the other hand, an actor has culpability if he deserves 
blame for engaging in the admittedly wrongful conduct.327 The foundational rules 
of morality (do not kill, do not steal, and so forth) are rules that proscribe 
wrongdoing rather than rules that gauge the actor’s culpability. Judgments about 
the morality of engaging in certain conduct are thus independent from judgments 
about whether an actor should be blamed for engaging in an immoral act.328 A case 
in which judgments of wrongdoing are divorced from judgments of blame is that 
of insane killings, where killing an innocent human being is deemed wrongful even 
where the actor is ultimately excused because he cannot be fairly blamed for the 
killing.329 
The distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness also helps to make 
sense of certain important features of tort law. As any first-year law student knows, 
children and the insane are held liable for their torts even though their conduct is 
not usually considered blameworthy for the purposes of the criminal law.330 
Therefore, as far as tort law is concerned, the wrongfulness of certain conduct is 
determined solely by the fact that the act unjustifiably infringes a rule of the 
system regardless of whether the infraction is blameworthy.331 Harming an 
innocent human being is morally and legally wrongful, even when the person who 
causes the harm is a minor or is insane. Once the independent moral significance 
of wrongdoing is grasped, it becomes clear why acceptance of the hard 
incompatibilist position does not lead to the rejection of morality. The foundational 
rules of morality proscribe engaging in wrongful conduct but have little to say 
about how and when judgments of blame are warranted. The hard incompatibilist 
position is in tension with the practice of blaming others for their conduct, but is 
compatible with the practice of proscribing wrongful conduct. Therefore, hard 
incompatibilism can be embraced without jettisoning morality. 
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A related objection must also be confronted. Can we identify coherent rules of 
morality if we assume that we lack free will? It seems that we can, at least if we 
adopt a consequentialist approach to morality.332 According to consequentialism, 
the morally correct course of conduct is that which maximizes good 
consequences.333 We adopt consequentialist rules in order to influence the behavior 
of the addressees of the legal rules.334 Given that humans are capable of 
understanding moral rules, their conduct is likely to be shaped in some way by the 
existence of such rules. It is important to note for our purposes that humans 
possess the capacity to learn and understand rules even if causal determinism 
obtains and it is deemed to be incompatible with the sort of freedom that 
undergirds judgments about moral responsibility. As a result, while the hard 
incompatibilist must concede that her position undermines judgments about blame 
and about attributing moral responsibility, she is in no way committed to accepting 
that her position is incompatible with the existence or potential usefulness of moral 
rules. 
 
5.  Why Assuming that We Lack Free Will May Be Good for Us 
 
These brief reflections reveal that assuming we lack free will does not drain 
life of all its beauties and does not deprive us of having healthy and fulfilling 
interpersonal relationships. While this assumption leads to modifying some aspects 
of our lives, there is no reason to believe that these modifications would lead to an 
utterly unappealing conception of life. It might even be the case that the opposite is 
true. Perhaps our life is made more appealing by assuming that humans are not 
endowed with the sort of freedom that makes them genuinely responsible for their 
acts. For one, adopting this attitude would inevitably lead to more compassion and 
understanding towards those who commit transgressions against us. If I truly 
believe that the person who stole my car is not to blame for his crime, then my 
reactions to his transgression will likely change from an initial feeling of 
indignation and resentment, to feelings of understanding and compassion; after all, 
he is no more to blame for his act than small children are to blame for their 
conduct or nature is to blame for natural disasters. Assuming that humans lack free 
will could thus lead to transforming most feelings of resentment and indignation 
into feelings of compassion and understanding. Living in a world without free will 
may very well turn out to be quite an appealing prospect. 
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VII.  PUNISHING WITHOUT FREE WILL 
 
Even if it is possible to live a fulfilling life without free will, could we still 
have a functioning and desirable system of criminal justice without free will? Once 
again, the conventionally accepted answer is that a system of criminal law without 
free will is likely to be unappealing. The starting point for this argument is that 
abandoning free will entails abandoning blame. Given that placing blame is an 
important feature of our current practices of punishment, it may appear that 
eliminating free will would deal a fatal blow to criminal law. These concerns are 
overblown. While dispensing with free will means that retributive theories of 
criminal justice must be abandoned, this does not threaten the consequentialist 
approaches to punishment. Furthermore, certain consequentialist approaches to 
punishment that are compatible with the assumption that we lack free will would 
seem to generate a more humane and efficient system of criminal law than our 
current system. The purpose of this Part is to explain what punishing without free 
will would look like and why it is arguably more desirable than a free-will-
centered approach to punishment. 
 
A.  Criminal Law Without Retribution: Towards an Incompatibilist and 
Consequentialist Approach to Punishment 
 
A criminal law without free will would obviously threaten the role of 
retribution in justifying punishment. Retribution is the belief that desert is a 
sufficient condition for punishment.335 Therefore, retributivists need to ascertain 
whether someone deserves to be punished before they can conclude whether 
punishing that person is justified.336 When does a person deserve to suffer under a 
retributive framework? A person deserves to suffer for doing “X” if, and only if, it 
is fair to blame him for having done “X.”337 If we assume that humans do not have 
the sort of freedom that undergirds moral responsibility, it necessarily follows that 
humans cannot be genuinely blamed for doing what they do. Given that the 
absence of blame negates genuine desert, retributive practices would thus be 
unjustified in a world without free will.338 From a practical standpoint, this means 
that the mere fact that a rational actor did something evil, bad, or wrongful is not in 
and of itself a sufficient reason to punish her. 
This does not mean that punishment would be unjustified in a world without 
free will. Although retributive punishment is ruled out by the assumption that 
humans lack free will, the assumption in no way undermines the imposition of 
punishment justified on consequentialist grounds.339 Punishment is justified on 
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consequentialist aims when the benefits of imposing it outweigh the costs of doing 
so.340 The paradigmatic consequentialist justification for punishment is deterring 
the future commission of offenses.341 Deterrence, in turn, can be general if it deters 
the community at large from committing offenses,342 or specific if it is intended to 
deter the particular individual who is being punished from committing future 
crimes.343 Rehabilitation is another consequentialist justification for punishment 
that is closely linked to specific deterrence—the aim of rehabilitation is to modify 
the convicted person’s conduct in a way that decreases the chances that she will 
recidivate.344 Finally, incapacitation is a consequentialist aim of punishment 
usually invoked as a way of neutralizing dangerous offenders who are not 
candidates for rehabilitation.345 All of these aims of punishment are not threatened 
by assuming that actors lack free will, since: (1) the threat of sanction can certainly 
influence the conduct of many actors (i.e., general and specific deterrence) 
regardless of whether they freely choose to be influenced by such forces, (2) 
behavior modification (i.e., rehabilitation) is perfectly compatible with the 
assumption that humans cannot freely determine their acts, and (3) the 
neutralization of dangerous individuals (incapacitation) can be achieved whether 
the individuals are free actors or not. 
Once we shift from retributive to consequentialist punishment, this begs the 
question: what should trigger the imposition of punishment? Under a retributive 
account of punishment, a finding of blameworthiness would trigger the imposition 
of punishment, but such a finding could not justify punishment on consequentialist 
grounds. Once blame is taken out of the equation, it is unclear what, if anything, 
could take its place.  
One alternative is to shift from blameworthiness to dangerousness as a 
prerequisite for the imposition of punishment.346 According to this view, 
punishment would be justified for the sake of social protection from dangerous 
individuals. The actor who commits a crime reveals himself as someone who poses 
danger to others. Punishment would thus be conceived as the state’s way of 
neutralizing the danger signified by the commission of the offense. In a world 
without free will, punishment could be reconceptualized as a vehicle for defusing 
dangerousness rather than as a mechanism for exacting retribution. 
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B.  Punishment as Quarantine (and Other Forms of Societal Protection): More 
Humane and Efficient than Retributive Based Punishment? 
 
A good way of illustrating what punishing for dangerousness would look like 
is to analogize the practice with the way the state fights contagious diseases. When 
a person is diagnosed with a highly contagious disease, it is sensible for society to 
take measures to protect itself against the threat.347 These measures are taken 
regardless of whether the person who suffers from the disease can be “blamed” for 
getting sick.348 The reason for taking these measures is that the sick individual 
poses a danger to society, rather than blameworthiness for his condition. Similarly, 
the person who commits a crime under the “punishment as a vehicle to defuse 
dangerousness” model will often be subjected to certain measures—not because he 
deserves to suffer, but instead because his conduct reveals that he poses a danger to 
the community. In the case of sick individuals, the severity of the measures will 
depend on how dangerous the sickness is believed to be.349 If the sickness is not 
particularly dangerous (a common cold, for example), no measures should be 
required, while if the sickness is sufficiently dangerous it may require that more 
intrusive measures (vaccination, treatment, quarantine, and so forth).350 Similarly, 
while no punishment might be required for a person who has committed a de 
minimis or trivial offense, a person who has committed a serious offense, such as 
murder and who has done so repeatedly, may require the imposition of much 
                                                 
347 In the United States, the task of protecting society from contagious diseases is of 
such importance that the government created an agency—the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)—to deal with the problem. 
348 While there are certainly cases in which a person is at fault for contracting a 
disease (think of someone who eats a wild mushroom without first determining whether it 
is toxic), in manyif not mostcases people contract diseases through no fault of their 
own (think of someone who takes a plane and is unfortunately assigned a seat next to a 
person who is very sick and contagious). 
349 Compare Interim Guidance on Infection Control Measures for 2009 H1N1 
Influenza in Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Personnel, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 15, 2010, 12:30 PM ET), 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm (“Isolation [of patients 
infected with H1N1 influenza] should be continued for the [seven] days after illness onset 
or until [twenty-four] hours after the resolution of fever and respiratory symptoms, 
whichever is longer . . . .”), with Seasonal Influenza (Flu): Infection Control in Health 
Care Facilities, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/longtermcare.htm (last updated Sept. 
16, 2010) (providing no specific isolation measures, while giving general prevention and 
hygiene advice). 
350 Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdfs/legal-authorities-isolation-
quarantine.pdf (last updated Jan. 29, 2010) (authorizing isolation and quarantine measures 
to prevent the spread of cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, 
yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and any 
strand of flu that can cause a pandemic). 
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harsher punishment, including incapacitative measures that would be the criminal 
law equivalent of quarantine. 
One surprising and salutary implication of reconceptualizing punishment as a 
vehicle for curbing dangerousness is that doing so will likely lead to less reliance 
on incarceration. Despite the fact that prisons were originally conceived as a place 
where convicts would go to get rehabilitated,351 it is widely agreed that prisons are 
not conducive to rehabilitation.352 In part because prisons are generally viewed as 
places that maximize the convict’s suffering instead of places where they can get 
the treatment they need.353 Thus, imprisonment is the punishment of choice today 
not because it is effective, but because it allows the state and society to make the 
convict suffer in order to exact retribution for the harm caused. While this 
conception of prisons as houses of suffering may adhere to retributive justice 
theory, it does not adhere to the consequentialist approach to punishment. Under a 
consequentialist approach, the sanction imposed ought to be the least intrusive 
sanction that can achieve the desired end in the most economically efficient 
fashion. Mass incarceration does not fit this standard, since imprisonment is among 
the costliest and most inefficient forms of punishment.354 A consequentialist 
approach to punishment would likely rely as little as possible on incarceration, 
given that most cases, including drug and weapon offenses, can be dealt with more 
efficiently through less intrusive sanctions. Examples may include supervised 
release, probation, drug treatment or intermediate sanctions that are less intrusive 
than incarceration but more intrusive than standard probation.355 
There is also good reason to believe that the consequentialist approach to 
punishment discussed here would push states to assume duties of treatment and 
rehabilitation of convicts. The analogy between this model of punishment and the 
state’s role in fighting contagious diseases is once again useful to illustrate this 
point. When someone is diagnosed with a contagious and dangerous disease, the 
government has three important and distinct obligations. First, the government 
                                                 
351 CURTIS R. BLAKELEY, AMERICA’S PRISONS: THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS PROFIT 
AND PRIVATIZATION 10–11 (2005). 
352 Id. at 11. 
353 See id. at 12 (“As profit is incorporated into the organizational structure of the 
prison, it emerges as the dominant goal and becomes the sole measure of success. A cost-
to-benefit-analysis is conducted prior to every action, ensuring that the prison will only 
behave in a manner that proves financially rewarding.”). Compare Adam J. Kolber, The 
Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 200 (2009) (“Experiential-
suffering retributivists hold a straightforward view that offenders should be made to suffer 
in experiential ways; offenders should feel physical and emotional pain and distress.”), with 
David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1650 (2010) (“The error is 
in the collapsing of two distinct moral concepts—‘crime’ and ‘punishment’—into an 
undifferentiated category of contingent effects—‘suffering.’ The consequences are far from 
trivial.”). 
354 STEVEN E. BARKAN & GEORGE J. BRYJAK, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 456 (2d ed. 2011). 
355 NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 84–90 (1990). 
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may defuse the danger presented by the person with the contagious disease.356 As 
previously discussed, this can be done in different ways, from prescribing 
medication to quarantining individuals.357 Second, the state has a duty to treat the 
individual in the most effective way available so that he can resume his normal life 
as soon as practicable.358 Finally, given that the individual who contracts a 
contagious disease is not considered evil or blameworthy, the state has an 
obligation to make the individual’s life—while undergoing treatment or 
quarantine—as pain free and pleasant as possible. Similarly, the “punishment as 
defusing dangerous offenders” model would lead to three governmental duties, 
namely: (1) the duty to defuse the danger posed by the wrongdoer by imposing 
some kind of punishment, (2) the obligation to give treatment to the wrongdoer so 
that his chances of reincorporating himself to society are increased, and (3) the 
duty to make the convict’s serving of his sentence as pain free and pleasant as 
possible. 
It therefore seems plausible that a consequentialist approach to punishment 
like, the one advocated here, will lead to a more humane criminal law—shifting 
the focus of punishment from making people suffer to treating people in a way that 
maximizes the likelihood that they will once again be able to participate in societal 
life without posing serious risks to others. With its emphasis on imprisonment, the 
current system leads to abject prison conditions359 and an overreliance on 
incarceration. In contrast, with its emphasis on curbing dangerousness and 
maximizing good consequences, the consequentialist approach to punishment 
discussed here would likely lead to less use of prison sanctions and more use of 
alternative methods of punishment—for example, home detention, treatment for 
drug and sex offenders, fines, supervised release, and community work.  
Increased reliance on these alternative punishments would make our criminal 
law more humane, compassionate and in tune with our current understanding of 
human behavior and techniques of behavior modification. Furthermore, this 
alternative model will likely be more economically efficient than one that relies 
primarily on incarceration as the preferred type of punishment. Given that 
imprisonment is a very costly type of punishment,360 incarcerating offenders 
should be a measure of last resort. As the literature on the costs of punishment 
illustrates, we have good reasons to impose imprisonment sanctions only when the 
risk of detection is extremely low and the offense committed is particularly 
                                                 
356 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2006) (authorizes the use of measures against contagious 
individuals in order to prevent the introduction, spread or transmission of communicable 
diseases). 
357 See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 350, at 1–2. 
358 Quarantine is typically as a measure of last resort. It can only be used when all 
other measures fail and should stop being used when least restrictive measures are enough 
to neutralize the threat. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Isolation and 
Quarantine, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH 1, 5, http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dph/ 
cdc/reporting/iq_faq.pdf (last updated Dec. 2010). 
359 See BLAKELY, supra note 351, at 12–13. 
360 BARKAN & BRYJAK, supra note 354, at 456. 
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grave.361 While such a sparse and economically efficient use of incarceration 
would be difficult to justify under a retributive criminal law, it would be very easy 
to justify under the consequentialist model of punishment discussed here. 
 
 
C.  Objections to Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness 
and Replies to the Objections 
 
1. Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness Would Justify 
Punishing the Innocent 
 
Up to this point, this Article has demonstrated that adopting a consequentialist 
approach to punishment that eschews any reference to desert and blame as a 
justification for punishment has many appealing implications. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that several important objections can be leveled against 
this conception of punishment. The first and most obvious objection is that any 
approach to punishment that dispenses with blame could justify punishing the 
innocent. This is a classic objection to consequentialist approaches to 
punishment.362 The retributive model of punishment easily avoids this objection, 
since the requirement of blame is built in to retributive justice. More specifically, 
blaming an innocent individual is unjust under a retributive model, for retributive 
punishment is only justified if the offender deserves to suffer and desert is a 
function of blame.363 Consequentialist approaches to punishment cannot avoid the 
problem easily, for blame is not a prerequisite for punishment under these 
theories.364 This is an objection that must be taken seriously, as there is something 
intuitively troubling about a theory that might justify punishing the innocent. 
If punishing the innocent means punishing someone who cannot be genuinely 
blamed for his conduct, then the consequentialist approach to punishment defended 
here inevitably leads to punishing the innocent. Given that the point of departure of 
the theory is that no one can be genuinely blamed for his acts, there is no way to 
escape this conclusion. Nevertheless, this concession is not as damning as it may 
seem at first glance, for we currently deprive children and the mentally ill of their 
freedom when they engage in wrongful yet blameless acts. Similarly, the model of 
punishment defended here would lead to imposing sanctions on blameless 
individuals who have engaged in wrongful acts. Thus, the only difference between 
the model defended here and our current approach to punishment is that under the 
model defended here sanctions imposed on blameless individuals count as 
“punishment,” whereas under the current model these sanctions are regarded as 
                                                 
361 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 551–52 (2004). 
362 See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 
13–14 (1987) (discussing the “punishing the innocent” objection). 
363 F. Rosen, Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: The Origins of a 
False Doctrine, 9 UTILITAS 23, 28 (1997). 
364 Id. at 23. 
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preventative measures. The differences between my proposed model and the 
current approach to punishment are mostly terminological and not of much 
normative significance. Furthermore, if punishing the innocent means punishing 
someone who has not engaged in wrongdoing, then the theory defended here does 
not lead to punishing the innocent.365 People who have not engaged in wrongful 
conduct should not be punished under the “punishment as a vehicle for defusing 
dangerousness” view, because the occurrence of a wrongful act is the event that 
triggers the prediction of future dangerousness. 
 
2. Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness Would Lead to 
Punishing People Before They Act 
 
Another objection to the view of punishment discussed here would be that 
focusing on dangerousness might lead to punishing dangerous people before they 
even engage in an act.366 This objection is inspired in part by Orwellian views367 of 
a future that would look like the one depicted in the film Minority Report,368 in 
which three “pre-cognizant” human oracles can identify future criminals before 
they engage in the criminal act.369 This would, in turn, cast doubt upon the so-
called act requirement—one of the most venerable and foundational doctrines of 
criminal law. It might also lead to punishing people for merely contemplating or 
thinking about committing an offense if such thoughts are believed to be indicative 
of dangerousness. This is not only normatively unappealing, but also 
constitutionally suspect. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that imposing 
punishment on people for so-called status offenses violates the Eighth Amendment 
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.370 Thus, an individual must be 
punished for what he has done, not for who he is. Furthermore, it is widely 
                                                 
365 There are at least two senses in which an actor might object to punishment based 
on her innocence. First, the actor might claim that although she engaged in wrongdoing she 
is innocent because she cannot be fairly blamed for engaging in the admittedly wrongful 
actthat is that her wrongdoing should be excused. Second, the actor might claim that she 
is innocent because she did not engage in a wrongful act at all. The theory of punishment 
espoused in this section can be objected based on the former conception of “innocence,” 
but not the latter. 
366 Robert Batey, Minority Report and the Law of Attempt, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 689 
(2004). 
367 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 174 (Holt Rinehart & Winston 2000) 
(1949) (“Thoughts and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally 
forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments, and vaporizations are 
not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely 
the wiping-out of persons who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future.”). 
368 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox Film Corporation, DreamWorks SKG 2002) 
(Based on a short story written in 1956: PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report, in THE 
MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC STORIES 71 (2002)). 
369 Id. 
370 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (“Even one day in 
prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
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believed that the Constitution also proscribes punishing mere thoughts or internal 
deliberations in the absence of some sort of act that demonstrates the firmness of 
their intentions.371 
The first reply to this objection is that there is currently no machine or human 
that can predict with accuracy whether a given individual will commit a crime in 
the future.372 Therefore, the risk of punishing someone who is not really dangerous 
based on abstract predictions of dangerousness is quite high. Given that the harm 
caused as a result of punishment in such cases is quite significant (deprivation of 
freedom in many cases), we have good reasons to inflict such harm only if there is 
near certainty about the triggering conditions that justify its infliction 
(dangerousness, according to the theory of punishment discussed here). Since we 
currently do not have the capacity to predict with any degree of certainty whether 
particular individuals who have not committed a wrongful act in the past will 
behave dangerously in the future, we ought to abstain from punishing people 
before they act based on predictions of dangerousness that are not grounded on the 
commission of prior wrongful acts. But what if sometime in the future we develop 
Minority Report-type technologies that allow us to predict future criminal acts with 
great accuracy well before that person commits an offense?373 Would it be 
acceptable to punish those persons before they engage in the wrongful conduct? If 
these cases ever arise in the future (this is a very big “if”), it might be legitimate to 
take action against the individual before he acts, and in some extreme cases 
limiting the actor’s freedom might be warranted. However, it might be better to 
treat these cases as instances of civil confinement, for it is not clear whether it 
makes sense to talk about “punishing” someone who has yet to do anything 
wrongful.374 
 
D.  Punishing Without Free Will—Summary 
 
The conventional wisdom is that it would be normatively unappealing to 
assume that humans lack free will. Making such an assumption would lead to an 
impoverished view of life and an unattractive system of criminal justice. Despite 
                                                 
371 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional 
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”). 
372 Some jurisdictions currently use a computer program that can help predict whether 
certain convicts are more or less likely to recidivate. Professor Richard Berk of the 
University of Pennsylvania developed the program. Professor Berk acknowledges, 
however, that the program “[is not] anywhere near being able to do [what the Minority 
Report pre-cognizants could do].” Daniel Bates, The Real Minority Report: U.S. Police 
Trial Computer Software That Predicts Who Is Most Likely to Commit a Crime, DAILY 
MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1306070 (last updated Aug. 
25, 2010 5:44 PM). 
373 Media reports are already drawing parallels between Professor Berk’s program and 
the machines used in Minority Report to predict future crimes. Id. 
374 This, in a sense, is something we already do when we decide we deal with a case 
of civil confinement. 
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its intuitive appeal, there are good reasons to believe that the conventional wisdom 
is wrong. Assuming that humans lack free will would lead to eliminating 
retribution as a justification for the imposition of punishment. Contrary to what 
avowed retributivists would have us believe, discarding retribution does not make 
our criminal justice system less attractive. A criminal law that does not rely on 
retribution as a justification for punishment ought to conceive punishment as a way 
of neutralizing dangerous offenders. Conceptualizing criminal law this way is 
likely to lead to a more economically efficient and humane system of criminal 
justice that relies less on incarceration and more on treatment and rehabilitation. 
As a result, there are good reasons to believe that assuming that humans lack free 
will would generate a more normatively appealing criminal law than the one we 
have today and this, in turn, provides us with good reasons to embrace an 
incompatibilist solution to the free will problem. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article opened with a reference to Voltaire’s Candide.375 In this 
celebrated book, Voltaire called our attention to the problem of free will by 
contrasting Candide’s view that what makes humans special is a kind of freedom 
that is lacking in other animals, with Martin’s view that determinism rules out the 
possibility of free will and, perhaps, moral responsibility. Since Candide was 
published many philosophers, scientists, and legal theorists have proposed 
different ways of solving the free will problem. After all this time, it can be 
asserted with confidence that there is no “knockout” argument that demonstrates 
that free will is compatible or incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. In 
the face of this dialectical stalemate, this Article has argued that we ought to 
decide whether to hold on to or abandon free will by asking whether assuming that 
we have free will is more or less normatively appealing than making the opposite 
assumption. This Article suggests that there are good reasons to believe that the 
most normatively attractive way out of the free will maze is to assume the 
incompatibility of determinism and indeterminism with the type of freedom that 
lies at the core of contemporary criminal law and theory. Doing so would not make 
our lives any less appealing, and it could lead to a more humane and efficient 
system of criminal justice than one that assumes than that we are endowed with the 
sort of free will that undergirds judgments of blame and praise. Consequently, 
contrary to what most philosophers and criminal scholars argue, punishing without 
free will is not less appealing than the alternative. 
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